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INTRODUCTION
The plaintiff, a whistleblower suing his former employer for improperly eliminating his position, requests all documents, notes, me1
moranda, e-mails, and metadata related to organizational restructur2
ing from the employer’s external hard drives. The defendant is a
relatively poor rural county that moves for a protection order, arguing
that the requests are overbroad and would cost the county approx3
imately $49,000 to produce, not including attorney review time. The
plaintiff’s potential recovery in the case is estimated to be “significant4
ly less” than $100,000. How should a judge rule on the request?
The explosion of costly electronic discovery in the mid-1990s
made this type of problem commonplace for district and magistrate
judges, who in turn began exercising their authority under Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 26(c) to allocate some expenses to the re5
questing parties. When a majority of the Supreme Court recently
cited “sprawling, costly, and hugely time-consuming” discovery as a
reason for its recognition of a heightened civil pleading standard in
6
Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, Justice Stevens retorted that Rule 26(c),
7
among others, supplied a better tool for managing pretrial costs.

1

Metadata is defined as “evidence, typically stored electronically, that describes
the characteristics, origins, usage and validity of other electronic evidence.” CRAIG
BALL, BEYOND DATA ABOUT DATA: THE LITIGATOR’S GUIDE TO METADATA 2 (2005),
http://www.craigball.com/metadata.pdf (internal quotation marks omitted). In other
words, it is “data about data.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
2
This example is derived from Haka v. Lincoln County, 246 F.R.D. 577, 578 (W.D.
Wis. 2007). For further discussion of this case, see subsection III.B.3.
3
246 F.R.D. at 578.
4
Id.
5
Rule 26(c)(1) provides that the “[t]he court may, for good cause, issue an order
to protect a party or person from . . . undue burden or expense, including . . . specifying terms, including time and place, for the disclosure or discovery.” FED. R. CIV. P.
26(c)(1); see also FED. R. CIV. P. 34 advisory committee’s note to 1970 amendments
(“[C]ourts have ample power under Rule 26(c) to protect respondent against undue
burden or expense, either by restricting discovery or requiring that the discovering
party pay costs.”).
6
550 U.S. 544, 560 n.6 (2007).
7
Justice Stevens stated,
The Court vastly underestimates a district court’s case-management arsenal. . . . Indeed, Rule 26(c) specifically permits a court to take actions “to protect a party or person from annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, or undue

2010]

When Should Discovery Come with a Bill?

1525

Providing an exception to the traditional discovery presumption that
8
each party to a lawsuit bears its own discovery costs, Rule 26(c) permits the district court to shift costs onto the party requesting discovery
9
upon a finding of “good cause.” But what constitutes “good cause,”
and how should a court determine the appropriate amount of cost
10
shifting? With little guidance from the Rules themselves or the
11
courts of appeal, lower courts initially developed several analytical
frameworks for analyzing the problem. These approaches can be
roughly grouped into four categories: (1) the “marginal utility” test
12
13
promulgated in McPeek v. Ashcroft, (2) the Rowe test, (3) the Zubu14
lake test, and, following the 2006 electronic discovery amendments to
the Rules, (4) the application to cost shifting of seven factors outlined
burden or expense” by, for example, disallowing a particular discovery request, setting appropriate terms and conditions, or limiting its scope.
In short, the Federal Rules contemplate that pretrial matters will be settled
through a flexible process of give and take, of proffers, stipulations, and
stonewalls, not by having trial judges screen allegations for their plausibility vel
non without requiring an answer from the defendant.
Id. at 593-94 n.13 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
8
As the Court stated in Oppenheimer Fund, Inc. v. Sanders,
Under [discovery] rules, the presumption is that the responding party must
bear the expense of complying with discovery requests, but he may invoke the
district court’s discretion under Rule 26(c) to grant orders protecting him
from “undue burden or expense” in doing so, including orders conditioning
discovery on the requesting party’s payment of the costs of discovery.
437 U.S. 340, 358 (1978).
9
FED. R. CIV. P. 26(c)(1).
10
Although the Rules were amended in 2006 to address electronic discovery concerns, they have not established a uniform analytical framework for addressing cost
shifting. See infra Part III.
11
The highly deferential “abuse of discretion” standard governing appellate review of cost-shifting discovery issues also precludes robust guidance from circuit courts.
See, e.g., Spears v. City of Indianapolis, 74 F.3d 153, 158 (7th Cir. 1996) (affirming
without extensive discussion the district court’s expense-shifting order due to Rule
26(c)’s grant of “considerable discretion in determining whether expense-shifting in
discovery production is appropriate in a given case”); see also Alan F. Blakley, Unanswered Questions in the December 2006 Federal Rules Changes, FED. LAW., Nov.–Dec. 2006, at
39, 40 (noting the dearth of appellate authority regarding electronic discovery).
12
See McPeek v. Ashcroft, 202 F.R.D. 31, 34 (D.D.C. 2001) (“The more likely it is
that the backup tape contains information that is relevant to a claim or defense, the
fairer it is that the government agency search at its own expense. The less likely it is,
the more unjust it would be to make the agency search at its own expense. The difference is ‘at the margin.’”).
13
See Rowe Entm’t, Inc. v. William Morris Agency, Inc., 205 F.R.D. 421, 429
(S.D.N.Y. 2002) (developing an eight-factor test discussed in subsection II.B.1).
14
See Zubulake v. UBS Warburg LLC, 217 F.R.D. 309, 322-23 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (developing a hierarchical seven-factor test discussed in Section II.C).
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in the Advisory Committee’s Note to Rule 26(b)(2), which were actually intended to guide the threshold question of whether certain
15
discovery should be produced in the first place.
This Comment analyzes the benefits and disadvantages of each
cost-shifting approach in the context of electronic discovery (e16
discovery). It examines civil cases in which the court considered ordering the requesting party to bear some or all of the expenses of the
responding party’s technical search, restoration, and production of
17
electronically stored information (ESI). The Comment’s scope is li18
mited to cost-shifting disputes between parties to a lawsuit. It also
15

See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(2) advisory committee’s note to 2006 amendments; see
also infra subsection III.B.2.
16
Electronic discovery involves electronically stored information, or ESI. See FED.
R. CIV. P. 34(a) advisory committee’s note to 2006 amendments (defining ESI broadly
as any type of information stored in any electronic medium).
17
Courts have typically refused to order reimbursement for parties to cover preproduction attorney review time because these costs do not relate to the technical inaccessibility of data (which justifies cost shifting) and because the producing party
could strategically pass heavy costs onto its opponent by controlling which attorneys
scrutinize the data and how thoroughly they do so. See Zubulake v. UBS Warburg LLC,
216 F.R.D. 280, 290-91 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (opining that “the responding party should always bear the cost of reviewing and producing electronic data once it has been converted to an accessible form” for two main reasons: (1) “the producing party has the
exclusive ability to control the cost of reviewing the documents,” and (2) “cost-shifting
is only appropriate for inaccessible . . . data”); Rowe, 205 F.R.D. at 432 (“[I]f any defendant elects to conduct a full privilege review of its e-mails prior to production, it shall
do so at its own expense.”). But see Medtronic Sofamor Danek, Inc. v. Michelson, 229
F.R.D. 550, 562 (W.D. Tenn. 2003) (ordering the requesting party to be responsible
for the full cost of the producing party’s relevance and privilege review for one set of
backup tapes and the full cost of the relevance review and half the cost of the privilege
review for another set of backup tapes). The Advisory Note to Rule 26(b)(2) cautions
against shifting attorney review costs but counsels that “the producing party’s burdens
in reviewing the information for relevance and privilege may weigh against permitting
the requested discovery.” FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(2) advisory committee’s note to 2006
amendments. At least one court has denied a motion to compel discovery by focusing
on the burden presented by attorney review time. In In re General Instrument Corp. Securities Litigation, the court found
that the requested documents could be retrieved from the backup tapes without undue expense. Nevertheless, the technical matter of retrieving the documents from the backup tapes would be just the start of the process. Defense
counsel would then have to read each e-mail, assess whether the e-mail was
responsive, and then determine whether the e-mail contained privileged information. Given that the volume of e-mail at issue here is potentially very
large, the court finds that the burden of reviewing the requested documents
would be heavy.
No. 96-1129, 1999 WL 1072507, at *6 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 18, 1999).
18
Courts are much more likely to shift costs away from subpoenaed nonparties.
See, e.g., Guy Chem. Co. v. Romaco AG, 243 F.R.D. 310, 313 (N.D. Ind. 2007) (stating
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does not analyze cost-shifting orders meant to serve as a sanction for
discovery violations.
Part I explores how the rise of costly electronic discovery in the
1990s led judges to consider cost shifting without developing robust
analytical tests.
Part II traces the development of multifactor tests as a more sophisticated tool to handle expensive discovery requests. Although
these tests were more systematic than the earlier approaches, they
contained flaws. The marginal utility test in practice largely ignored
19
the economic costs of each particular production. The Rowe test
employed a mechanical factor-counting approach that led to libera20
lized cost shifting in every reported case where it was applied. It also
accompanied a plaintiff-friendly discovery protocol, which seemed to
authorize intrusive “fishing expeditions” so long as they were financed
21
by the requesting parties. The weighted-factor Zubulake test provided
sound analytical underpinnings, but in practice it resulted in some22
what divergent decisions hinging on the least important factors.
Part III evaluates the 2006 amendments to Rule 26(b)(2), which
provided a multifactor test for the production of inaccessible data that
many courts apply in determinations of cost shifting. This Part’s qualitative analysis is supplemented with some broader observations from
23
a survey of sixty-five published federal cases discussing cost shifting.
that nonparty status was “[t]he most crucial factor” in the court’s decision to order
reimbursement of the subpoenaed nonparty for $7200 in costs).
19
See infra Section II.A.
20
See infra subsection II.B.1.
21
See infra subsection II.B.2.
22
See infra Section II.C.
23
To be robust, any quantitative conclusions on cost shifting should be based on a
full review of every federal case on the topic, including magistrate opinions and orders,
many of which are not selected for publication in any electronic database—an effort
beyond the scope of this Comment. In order to ascertain some possible trends, however, the following methodology was used. First, a search of the Westlaw database was
conducted for federal decisions dated before December 1, 2006, citing the McPeek,
Rowe, or Zubulake cases or containing the words “electronic,” “discovery,” “shift,” and
“cost” in close proximity to each other. The second step involved a review of leading
journal articles on cost shifting to identify important cases the searches may have
missed. These two steps provided a pool of twenty-eight relevant opinions prior to the
2006 amendments. In these twenty-eight cases, the court ordered cost shifting eleven
times, although in three of them, the requesting party had offered to pay. See, e.g., Antioch Co. v. Scrapbook Borders, Inc., 210 F.R.D. 645, 651-53 (D. Minn. 2002) (permitting the requesting party to hire an expert at its own expense to create a “mirror image” of the defendants’ computers and restore all data prior to a Rule 26(f)
conference and the beginning of any formal discovery); Simon Prop. Group L.P. v.
mySimon, Inc., 194 F.R.D. 639, 641 (S.D. Ind. 2000) (permitting the plaintiff to search
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A significant majority of these cases involve individual plaintiffs requesting information preserved by corporate defendants on complex
24
electronic networks and storage tapes. This pattern is unsurprising.
the defendant’s computers for deleted files at the plaintiff’s own cost); Playboy Enters.,
Inc. v. Welles, 60 F. Supp. 2d 1050, 1054 (S.D. Cal. 1999) (same). But see Cognex Corp.
v. Electro Scientific Indus., Inc., No. 01-10287, 2002 WL 32309413, at *4-5 (D. Mass.
July 2, 2002) (noting that the plaintiff’s willingness to pay for restoration of backup
tapes made the question of ordering discovery “a close call,” but denying discovery).
Next, the above search was rerun to focus on opinions published after the 2006
amendments. Ken Withers’s comprehensive compilation of 223 federal cases relating
to electronic discovery between December 1, 2006, and August 15, 2008 was also reviewed. See KEN WITHERS, FEDERAL COURT DECISIONS INVOLVING ELECTRONIC DISCOVERY: DECEMBER 1, 2006–AUGUST 15, 2008 (2008), http://www.ck10.uscourts.gov/
conference/downloads/ediscovery7.pdf. These two searches located thirty-seven opinions issued after December 1, 2006, that analyzed cost shifting outside of sanctions.
Cost shifting was ordered in only three of these decisions, two of which involved requesting parties willing to pay to conduct their own forensic examinations of the respondents’ computers. See Sterle v. Elizabeth Arden, Inc., No. 06-01584, 2008 WL
961216, at *2 (D. Conn. Apr. 9, 2008) (ordering conditional cost shifting if the plaintiff did not uncover relevant documents from the defendant’s systems); Thielen v.
Buongiorno USA, Inc., No. 06-0016, 2007 WL 465680, at *3 (W.D. Mich. Feb. 8, 2007)
(ordering “forensic examination of plaintiff’s computer”). The sole cost-shifting decision in which the requesting party was clearly opposed to paying expenses provides the
example in the Introduction to this Comment. See Haka v. Lincoln County, 246 F.R.D.
577, 578 (W.D. Wis. 2007). This case is discussed in subsection III.B.3.
24
See, e.g., Haka, 246 F.R.D. at 578 (describing an individual plaintiff’s requests for
documents related to employment discrimination); In re Veeco Instruments, Inc. Sec.
Litig., No. 05-1695, 2007 WL 983987, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 2, 2007) (explaining the lead
class action plaintiff’s request for documents from the corporate defendant); Quinby v.
WestLB AG, 245 F.R.D. 94, 96 (S.D.N.Y. 2006) (describing the individual plaintiff’s requests related to gender and employment discrimination); Wiginton v. CB Richard
Ellis, Inc., 229 F.R.D. 568, 569-70 (N.D. Ill. 2004) (recounting class action plaintiffs’
requests for documents relating to sexual harassment in the workplace); Zubulake v.
UBS Warburg LLC, 217 F.R.D. 309, 311-12 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (illustrating the potential
complexity of an individual plaintiff’s requests for extensive documentation related to
employment discrimination); Rowe Entm’t, Inc. v. William Morris Agency, Inc., 205
F.R.D. 421, 423-24 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) (describing individual concert-promoter plaintiffs’
broad requests for documents from defendant booking agencies and other promoters
relating to antitrust violations); McPeek v. Ashcroft, 202 F.R.D. 31, 31-32 (D.D.C. 2001)
(explaining an individual plaintiff’s requests for documents related to employment
discrimination); In re Brand Name Prescription Drugs Antitrust Litig., No. 94-0897,
1995 WL 360526, at *1 (N.D. Ill. June 15, 1995) (recounting requests by class action
plaintiffs for documents from the corporate defendant); Bills v. Kennecott Corp., 108
F.R.D. 459, 460 (D. Utah 1985) (describing the plaintiffs’ requests for documents related to age-based employment discrimination). There are exceptions, of course.
Sometimes the requesting party is a defendant. See Coburn v. PN II, Inc., No. 07-00662,
2008 WL 879746, at *2 (D. Nev. Mar. 28, 2008) (authorizing cost shifting where the defendant former employer offered to pay for a forensic examination of the plaintiff’s
home computer); Medtronic Sofamor Danek, Inc. v. Michelson, 229 F.R.D. 550, 562
(W.D. Tenn. 2003) (ordering an individual defendant to bear some costs of the plaintiff’s restoration of network backup tapes in a trade secrets case where the defendant
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Judicial intervention into cost shifting is most necessary when there is
a structural imbalance in the amount of discovery each party must
produce, such that the requesting party has little incentive to nego25
Because of this structural characteristic, the
tiate mutual limits.
terms “requesting parties” and “plaintiffs” are used interchangeably
throughout this Comment unless otherwise noted in the discussion of
26
particular cases.
My survey reveals that although courts have not uniformly applied
Rule 26(b)(2), there appears to have been a decline in cost-shifting
27
orders following the 2006 e-discovery amendments. Although the
sample of cases in the survey may not necessarily be representative of
28
all cost-shifting opinions, I posit that cost shifting is likely rarer now
because the amended Rules make reasonably inaccessible data pre29
sumptively undiscoverable and also emphasize negotiation among
30
parties, limiting the need for judicial intervention.
Part IV recognizes two troubling trends in cost-shifting cases: (1)
the tendency of some courts to liberally shift costs in lieu of denying
meritless discovery and (2) the possibility that wealthier parties’ greater willingness to pay provides them with significantly upgraded access
to discovery over poorer parties. It concludes that as discovery costs
continue to spiral upwards, the optimal discovery paradigm would
had requested that the plaintiff produce network backup tapes). While a large portion
of cost-shifting cases involve individuals litigating against corporations, some costshifting cases involve corporations on both sides. See, e.g., Multitech. Servs., L.P. v. Verizon Sw., No. 02-0702, 2004 WL 1553480, at *1 (N.D. Tex. July 12, 2004) (describing the
plaintiff corporation’s requests for documents from the defendant corporation).
25
This is most apparent in employment discrimination cases where the defendant
employer maintains and produces most of the discovery. See Rodney A. Satterwhite &
Matthew J. Quatrara, Asymmetrical Warfare: The Cost of Electronic Discovery in Employment
Litigation, 14 RICH. J.L. & TECH. 9, ¶¶ 7–9, at 3-4 (2008), http://jolt.richmond.edu/
v14i3/article9.pdf (describing systemic discovery concerns in employment litigation
where the median settlement is only $70,000 and the defendant employer is disproportionately responsible for restoring and producing the relevant discovery).
26
Similarly, the terms “responding parties” and “defendants” are used interchangeably in the general text.
27
See infra subsection III.B.3.
28
See supra note 23 (discussing the limitations of the survey and describing its methodology).
29
See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(2)(B) (“A party need not provide discovery of electronically stored information from sources that the party identifies as not reasonably accessible because of undue burden or cost.”). The two-tiered discovery system created by
Rule 26(b)(2)(B) is discussed in subsection III.B.1.
30
See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(f) (“In conferring, the parties must consider the nature and
basis of their claims . . . and develop a proposed discovery plan.”). This negotiation,
which often occurs surrounding a discovery conference, is discussed in subsection III.B.3.
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resort to cost shifting only when informational uncertainty makes the
likelihood of uncovering critical information a very close call. The
optimal approach would involve storage-tape sampling to determine
31
the likelihood of uncovering relevant data, followed by a combination of the two-tiered discovery structure in amended Rule 26(b)(2),
as well as the factors in the Zubulake test, to guide judges in determining when ordering both discovery and cost shifting is appropriate.
I. DEFINING THE PROBLEM: EARLY APPROACHES TO COST SHIFTING
In the mid-1990s, the traditional American paradigm of forcing
each party to bear its own costs was undermined by one-sided and
tremendous expenses associated with electronic discovery. As ediscovery became more common, the view that a producing party
must automatically bear its associated expense as a cost of doing business became as outmoded as Commodore 64 computers. With individual plaintiffs able to coerce corporate defendants into settling because of the high cost of discovery, courts began developing factintensive balancing tests conditioning discovery on the requesting party’s ability to pay for it.
A. Electronic Discovery Expenses as a Cost of Doing Business
When the Supreme Court reaffirmed the presumption that “the
responding party must bear the expense of complying with discovery
32
requests” in 1978, complex discovery typically entailed scores of
young associates reviewing boxes of documents in corporate ware33
houses. Respondents who made their paper records available for inspection were able to limit plaintiffs’ fishing expeditions to the extent
34
of the plaintiffs’ available manpower. Courts typically refused to shift
31

Sampling is the process of restoring only a small portion of backup tapes for
review, typically at the responding party’s expense, to better estimate the costs and likelihood of success of the entire requested production. See Zubulake v. UBS Warburg
LLC, 217 F.R.D. 309, 324 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (“[B]y requiring a sample restoration of
backup tapes, the entire cost-shifting analysis can be grounded in fact rather than
guesswork.”).
32
Oppenheimer Fund, Inc. v. Sanders, 437 U.S. 340, 358 (1978); see also id. (noting that the responding party may, however, “invoke the district court’s discretion under Rule 26(c) to grant orders protecting him from ‘undue burden or expense’ in
doing so, including orders conditioning discovery on the requesting party’s payment of
the costs of discovery”).
33
See MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION (FOURTH) § 11.446 (2004) (stating that
“warehouse” reviews kept the potential for fishing expeditions in check).
34
In Bills v. Kennecott Corp., the court presciently noted that
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costs for expensive productions by stating that the defendants should
have foreseen the cost when they chose to use expensive storage me35
chanisms: the so-called “cost of doing business” argument. For example, in Delozier v. First National Bank of Gatlinburg, the defendant was
ordered to pay for the photocopying of its records from microfilm be36
cause the defendant elected to save its records in that form. In Daewoo
Electronics Co. v. United States, the United States Court of International
Trade held that “[t]he normal and reasonable translation of electronic data into a form usable by the discovering party should be the ordinary and foreseeable burden of a respondent in the absence of a
37
showing of extraordinary hardship.” For the most part, courts did
not even consider allocating costs.
Even when courts analyzed cost shifting prior to the mid-1990s,
the result generally remained the same. One of the earliest cases to
consider cost shifting was Bills v. Kennecott Corp., an age discrimination
action in which plaintiffs requested that their former employer pro38
vide printed computer records. The defendant printed the data and
39
moved the court for reimbursement of the $5411 cost. Recognizing
that the advisory notes to Rule 26(c) provided “no guidance” on determining what type of discoverable computer-stored information
40
constitutes an undue burden, the court set forth four relevant factors: (1) the total cost of production; (2) “the relative expense and
burden” to each party in obtaining the data; (3) whether the requesting party would be substantially burdened by the expense; and (4)
whether the responding party would benefit in any way from product-

cost-shifting by means of simply producing volumes of records for inspection
by the other side may be or may become a thing of the past in this computer
age, [with] the only recourse [being] . . . a protective order under Rule 26(c)
for undue expense or burden in order to shift the financial burden to the requesting party or to limit discovery.
108 F.R.D. 459, 462 (D. Utah 1985).
35
See, e.g., Kozlowski v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 73 F.R.D. 73, 76 (D. Mass. 1976)
(holding that a defendant “may not excuse itself from compliance with Rule 34 . . . by
utilizing a system of [nonelectronic] record-keeping which conceals rather than discloses relevant records, or makes it unduly difficult to identify or locate them, thus
rendering the production of the documents an excessively burdensome and costly expedition” (citation omitted)).
36
109 F.R.D. 161, 164 (E.D. Tenn. 1986).
37
650 F. Supp. 1003, 1006 (Ct. Int’l Trade 1986).
38
108 F.R.D. at 460.
39
Id.
40
Id. at 462.
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41

ing the data. With all four factors favoring the requesting party, the
42
court declined the defendant’s motion.
Although the Bills court stated that it was not promulgating an
43
“ironclad formula,” the four-factor test became the “golden rule” for
44
courts evaluating the problem until the Rowe decision. Despite its
popularity, the Bills balancing test did not put an end to the “cost of
doing business” argument. For example, in 1995, the Northern District of Illinois purported to apply the test in In re Brand Name Prescription Drugs Antitrust Litigation, but it focused heavily on the defendant’s
decision to store information on backup tapes as a reason to reject
45
cost shifting. While acknowledging that the $50,000 to $70,000 retrieval cost was “expensive,” the court did “not believe that it is a burden that the Class Plaintiffs should bear, particularly where, as here,
‘the costliness of the discovery procedure involved is . . . a product of
the defendant’s record-keeping scheme over which the [plaintiffs
46
have] no control.’” This view did not persist long. As typical discovery expenses rose into the hundreds of thousands of dollars, courts
began to move past the “cost of doing business” position.
B. The Rise of Electronic Discovery
The rapid computerization of the 1990s quickly made “cost of doing
business” decisions like In re Brand Name Prescription Drugs obsolete. By
the year 2000, as storage space became cheaper, nearly one-third of elec47
tronically stored documents remained solely in electronic form. Conventional warehouse productions, with their expenses limited by the
manpower available to requesting parties to photocopy data, were replaced by computerized environments with low searching and copying
48
costs but tremendous restoration and processing expenses.

41

Id. at 464.
Id.
43
Id. at 463.
44
See Corinne L. Giacobbe, Note, Allocating Discovery Costs in the Computer Age: Deciding Who Should Bear the Costs of Discovery of Electronically Stored Data, 57 WASH. & LEE L.
REV. 257, 282-83 (2000) (remarking that although the Bills court considered it “judicially imprudent” to apply identical factors in all situations, several cases prior to 2000
did just that (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Bills, 108 F.R.D. at 463)).
45
No. 94-0897, 1995 WL 360526, at *2 (N.D. Ill. June 15, 1995).
46
Id. (quoting Delozier v. First Nat’l Bank of Gatlinburg, 109 F.R.D. 161, 164 (E.D.
Tenn. 1986)).
47
See Giacobbe, supra note 44, at 259.
48
See MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION (FOURTH) § 11.446 (2004).
42
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As corporations implemented archival systems designed to recover
lost data, they unwittingly provided plaintiffs with a fertile new source
of potentially relevant documents, raising discovery costs immensely.
49
Because discovery disproportionately burdened corporate defendants,
some plaintiffs began to strategically employ “weapons of mass discov50
51
ery” to force settlements. So long as a plaintiff could meet the minimal threshold requirements of Rule 26(b)(1) for the discoverability
52
of information, it could present the defendant with a Hobson’s choice
of funding prohibitively expensive discovery or settling the suit. For example, when plaintiffs suing a small company realized that it held about
115 backup tapes in a small warehouse, they strategically pushed the
magistrate judge to grant their motion to compel, presenting a $1.25
million price tag for the small company and resulting in an instant set53
tlement. In cases like this, the magistrate judge, whose authority is re54
stricted to nondispositive actions, could nevertheless effectively dis55
pose of an action by granting an improvident discovery order.
According to the 2008 Socha-Gelbmann Electronic Discovery Survey Report, litigants spent $2.79 billion on electronic discovery in

49

See Satterwhite & Quatrara, supra note 25, ¶¶ 7–9, at 3-4 (noting the disparities
in costs between employers and employees in employment litigation).
50
See Public Hearing on Proposed Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure Before the Civil Rules Advisory Comm. 4 ( 2005), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/rules/
e-discovery/0112frcp.pdf [hereinafter Hearing] (statement of Greg McCurdy, Senior
Attorney, Microsoft Corporation) (referencing the term used by a member of the Florida plaintiffs’ bar).
51
Id. at 4, 11.
52
Rule 26(b)(1) permits parties to “obtain discovery regarding any nonprivileged
matter that is relevant to any party’s claim or defense . . . [that is] reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.” FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(1).
53
Hearing, supra note 50, at 11 (statement of Greg McCurdy, Senior Attorney, Microsoft Corporation).
54
The authority of a magistrate judge is broadly restricted:
[A] judge may designate a magistrate judge to hear and determine any pretrial matter pending before the court, except a motion for injunctive relief, for
judgment on the pleadings, for summary judgment, to dismiss or quash an indictment or information made by the defendant, to suppress evidence in a
criminal case, to dismiss or to permit maintenance of a class action, to dismiss
for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, and to involuntarily dismiss an action.
28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A) (2006).
55
District courts review magistrates’ discovery orders under the highly deferential
clear error standard. See id.
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56

2007, an increase of 43% over 2006.
An ongoing copyright infringement suit between software giants Oracle Corporation and SAP
57
The plaintiff,
AG illustrates some of these expenses in practice.
Oracle, requested discovery from 165 defendant custodians, which
would have taken a year to produce and cost $16.5 million in addition
58
to other discovery from central repositories. Relying on the propor59
tionality provisions of Rule 26(b)(2)(C)(iii), discussed in Part III, and
Rule 1’s overarching mandate to provide a “just, speedy, and inexpen60
sive determination of every action and proceeding,” the magistrate
judge limited discovery to 120 custodians, reducing the defendant’s estimated expense for this particular request to $11.5 million without
61
engaging in cost shifting. Though the multimillion-dollar expenses
in the Oracle case represent a rather extreme example, electronic discovery undeniably became a pricey proposition over the last fifteen
years, requiring careful management, including cost shifting by judges.
C. The Move Toward Cost Shifting
As it became clear that electronic discovery could not be treated
exactly like traditional discovery, courts started balancing plaintiffs’
legitimate requests for information with defendants’ right not to be
unduly burdened by discovery. The possibility of shifting costs in appropriate cases presented a nuanced solution to the inherent uncertainty of electronic discovery—that is, whether costly restoration was
likely to lead to the discovery of relevant documents. Backup tapes
save mirror images of the user’s computer structure for catastrophic
recovery purposes, but they are not designed to allow users to easily
62
cull relevant documents. Because backup tapes are not indexed and
56

See George Socha & Tom Gelbmann, A Look at the 2008 Socha-Gelbmann Survey, LAW
TECH. NEWS, Aug. 2008, http://www.law.com/jsp/lawtechnologynews/PubArticleLTN.
jsp?id=1202423646479#.
57
See Oracle Corp. v. SAP AG, No. 07-01658 (N.D. Cal. July 3, 2008), available at
http://www.tnlawsuit.com/uploads/Order%20Re%20Scope%20of%20Discovery%20o
f%20Electronically%20Stored%20Information.pdf.
58
Id. slip op. at 2.
59
The Rule authorizes the court to limit the frequency or extent of discovery if it
determines that “the burden or expense of the proposed discovery outweighs its likely
benefit, considering the needs of the case, the amount in controversy, the parties’ resources, the importance of the issues at stake in the action, and the importance of the
proposed discovery in resolving the issues.”
60
FED. R. CIV. P. 1.
61
Oracle, No. 07-01658, slip op. at 3.
62
See Ross Chaffin, Comment, The Growth of Cost-Shifting in Response to the Rising
Cost and Importance of Computerized Data in Litigation, 59 OKLA. L. REV. 115, 122 (2006)

2010]

When Should Discovery Come with a Bill?

1535

do not capture documents created and deleted prior to the scheduled
backup, typically neither party can prove that restoration would certainly lead to the production of relevant data. Cost shifting permits
judges to deal with the uncertainty by accommodating plaintiffs who
have good reason to believe that backup tapes contain crucial information while protecting defendants from financial hardship. Magistrate Judge James Francis, author of the influential Rowe cost-shifting
analysis discussed in subsection II.B.1, has pointed out that when the
judge is only forty percent certain that the restored information would
be useful, shifting some costs is an improvement over simply granting
63
or denying discovery altogether.
The move toward cost shifting began in the mid-1990s, with the
Manual for Complex Litigation recommending it when parties “request
production in a form that can be created only at substantial expense
64
for additional programming.”
Despite this recommendation, e65
discovery cost shifting prior to the year 2000 was rare. Courts considered ordering it only when plaintiffs asked for permission to conduct
forensic examinations of defendants’ computers at their own expense.
By December 2006, however, at least eleven courts ordered the requesting parties to bear expenses, often over the latter’s vigorous ob66
jections to the allocation. Cost shifting even found application in
67
nonelectronic discovery cases. The next Part details the advantages
(describing the large storage capacity of backup tapes and noting the high costs associated with their restoration).
63
See James C. Francis IV, Preservation, Production & Cost-Shifting in E-Discovery, in
ELECTRONIC DISCOVERY GUIDANCE 2008: WHAT CORPORATE AND OUTSIDE COUNSEL
NEED TO KNOW 11, 19 (PLI Litig. & Admin. Practice, Course Handbook Series No. H783, 2008).
64
MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION (SECOND) § 21.446 (1985).
65
This Comment’s survey identified only two cases ordering cost shifting for electronic discovery up to and including the year 2000. See Simon Prop. Group L.P. v. mySimon, Inc., 194 F.R.D. 639, 641 (S.D. Ind. 2000) (permitting the plaintiff to search
the defendant’s computers for deleted files at the plaintiff’s own cost); Playboy Enters.,
Inc. v. Welles, 60 F. Supp. 2d 1050, 1054 (S.D. Cal. 1999) (same).
66
Cf. Wiginton v. CB Richard Ellis, Inc., 229 F.R.D. 568, 574, 577 (N.D. Ill. 2004)
(ordering the plaintiffs in an employment and gender discrimination case to pay 25%
of the costs of restoring the defendant’s backup tapes, after a sample revealed a 4.5%
to 6.5% responsive rate); OpenTV v. Liberate Techs., 219 F.R.D. 474, 479 (N.D. Cal.
2003) (directing corporate parties in an intellectual property suit to split costs for extracting source code from the defendant’s database).
67
Although this Comment focuses strictly on e-discovery, it should be noted that the
balancing tests developed for e-discovery, like the Zubulake test discussed in Section II.C,
have been modified and used in nonelectronic discovery settings. See Multitech. Servs.,
L.P. v. Verizon Sw., No. 02-0702, 2004 WL 1553480, at *1-2 (N.D. Tex. July 12, 2004)
(modifying the Zubulake factors and ordering cost shifting for nonelectronic interrogato-

1536

University of Pennsylvania Law Review

[Vol. 158: 1523

and drawbacks of the multifactor cost-shifting tests developed by
judges prior to the 2006 electronic discovery amendments.
II. COST-SHIFTING TESTS PRIOR TO THE
2006 E-DISCOVERY AMENDMENTS
Though courts generally appreciated the ability to shift costs as a
way to resolve informational uncertainties, they had to determine
when cost shifting would be appropriate and what percent of the expenses should be shared. Some courts eschewed multifactor analysis,
considering instead whether a plaintiff’s requests seemed to offend
the spirit of Rule 1, which states that the intent and purpose of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure is the “just, speedy, and inexpensive
68
determination of every action.” For example, courts have cited Rule
1 to prohibit outright discovery that “would properly be characterized
as a fishing expedition, causing needless expense and burden to all
69
concerned” and to refuse reimbursement of expenses incurred by
parties in electronically converting files for their own litigation pur70
poses. Rule 26(c) authorizes judges, “for good cause, [to] issue an
order to protect a party or person from . . . undue burden or expense,
71
including . . . specifying terms . . . for the disclosure or discovery.”
Yet neither Rule 1 nor Rule 26(c) provides particular guidance on
when cost shifting is appropriate. Under the 2000 amendments, Rule
26(b)(2)(iii) offered five factors to consider in weighing the “burden
or expense of the proposed discovery” against its “likely benefit”: “the
needs of the case, the amount in controversy, the parties’ resources,

ries); see also UPS, Inc. v. Net, Inc., 222 F.R.D. 69, 71 (E.D.N.Y. 2004) (“Therefore, the
Court finds that the maturation of Rule 26(b)(2) over several decades allows judges to
use the limitations of Rule 26(b)(2) with increasing frequency and with an eye toward
equity. This, undeniably, includes cost-shifting in [non-electronic] discovery.”).
68
FED. R. CIV. P. 1. See generally Mia Mazza, Emmalena K. Quesada & Ashley L.
Sternberg, In Pursuit of FRCP 1: Creative Approaches to Cutting and Shifting the Costs of Discovery of Electronically Stored Information, 13 RICH. J.L. & TECH. 1, ¶ 176, at 87 (2007),
http://jolt.richmond.edu/v13i3/article11.pdf (“[L]itigants should be aggressive in
invoking [Rule] 1 as a basis for the innovative use of search strategies and cost-shifting
to increase efficiency and reduce costs across the board in discovery.”).
69
N. River Ins. Co. v. Greater N.Y. Mut. Ins. Co., 872 F. Supp 1411, 1412 (E.D. Pa.
1995).
70
See In re Bristol-Myers Squibb Sec. Litig., 205 F.R.D. 437, 443 (D.N.J. 2002) (refusing to order the plaintiffs to reimburse half of the costs of the defendant’s conversion of
paper copies into electronic form when the defendants did so for their own use in litigation); Hines v. Widnall, 183 F.R.D. 596, 601 (N.D. Fla. 1998) (“[I]t is simply illogical to
require plaintiffs to help defendant pay for something [defendant] did voluntarily.”).
71
FED. R. CIV. P. 26(c)(1).

2010]

When Should Discovery Come with a Bill?

1537

the importance of the issues at stake in the action, and the impor72
tance of the discovery in resolving the issues.” These five factors,
however, were intended to guide the court to limit the frequency or
extent of discovery, which is a different question than when discovery
should proceed but with cost shifting. Although some courts insisted
that Rule 26(b)(2) sufficiently guided both discovery-production and
73
cost-shifting decisions, others applied three widely used tests prior to
the 2006 e-discovery amendments: (1) a marginal utility test from
74
McPeek v. Ashcroft, (2) an eight-factor test from Rowe Entertainment,
75
Inc. v. William Morris Agency, Inc., and (3) a seven-factor weighted test
76
from Zubulake v. UBS Warburg LLC.
A. The Marginal Utility Test
Steven McPeek, an employee at the Department of Justice (DOJ),
alleged that the DOJ failed to keep its prior sexual harassment settle77
He proment with him confidential and retaliated against him.
pounded requests to have the DOJ search its backup tapes for data
that might have been deleted by the DOJ’s computer users but pre78
served on the tapes. Although he established that his supervisors
used their computers for word processing and e-mail, McPeek presented no evidence that there were particularly relevant deleted e79
mails likely to be recovered.
Magistrate Judge John Facciola began by dismissing the implication from In re Brand Name Prescription Drugs that restoring all backup
tapes is necessary in every case and that the defendant should pay for

72

FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(2)(iii) (2000). Following the 2006 amendments, this proportionality test became a guide for evaluating whether parties showed “good cause”
when requesting information that “is not reasonably accessible because of undue burden or cost.” For dicussion of Rule 26(b)(2)(B) following the 2006 amendments, see
Section III.B.
73
See, e.g., Thompson v. U.S. Dep’t of Hous. & Urban Dev., 219 F.R.D. 93, 98 (D.
Md. 2003) (stating that in addition to the marginal utility, Rowe, and Zubulake tests, “it
also can be argued with some force that the Rule 26(b)(2) balancing factors are all
that is needed to allow a court to reach a fair result when considering the scope of discovery of electronic records”).
74
202 F.R.D. 31, 34 (D.D.C. 2001).
75
205 F.R.D. 421, 429 (S.D.N.Y. 2002).
76
217 F.R.D. 309, 320-23 (S.D.N.Y. 2003).
77
McPeek, 202 F.R.D. at 32.
78
Id.
79
See id. at 33 (stating that there was only a “theoretical possibility” the tapes might
contain something relevant to a claim or defense).

1538

University of Pennsylvania Law Review

[Vol. 158: 1523
80

the restoration as a cost of its “choice to use computers.”
ciola proceeded,

Judge Fac-

A fairer approach borrows, by analogy, from the economic principle of
“marginal utility.” The more likely it is that the backup tape contains information that is relevant to a claim or defense, the fairer it is that the
government agency search at its own expense. The less likely it is, the
more unjust it would be to make the agency search at its own expense.
81
The difference is “at the margin.”

Judge Facciola recognized that the marginal utility approach by itself
does not involve economic considerations and stated that these considerations should also be analyzed to prevent defendants from shoul82
dering an “undue burden.” Without elaborating on how the economic side of his test might be evaluated, however, Judge Facciola ordered
the DOJ to restore one year worth of backup tapes and to detail its costs
83
to help decide whether further searches were necessary.
Other courts followed McPeek’s marginal utility analysis and incremental approach. In Byers v. Illinois State Police, plaintiffs alleging
employment discrimination demanded e-mails that could be recovered only by licensing and reprogramming the defendant’s old e-mail
84
program at a cost between $20,000 and $30,000. The plaintiffs argued that the backup tapes would contain a particular racist e-mail
substantiating their claims, but none of the persons they deposed con85
firmed the existence of the e-mail. The court focused its inquiry on
the plaintiffs’ inability to establish the likelihood of uncovering relevant e-mails compared to the significant burden of the request and
86
shifted all restoration costs to the plaintiffs. The court appeared particularly exasperated that the plaintiffs requested eight years worth of
e-mails rather than targeting the months leading up to the discrimina87
tion. Complete cost shifting would provide plaintiffs with an “incen88
tive to focus their requests.”

80

Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
Id. at 34.
82
Id.; see also id. (“If the likelihood of finding something was the only criterion,
there is a risk that someone will have to spend hundreds of thousands of dollars to
produce a single e-mail.”).
83
Id. at 34-35.
84
No. 99-8105, 2002 WL 1264004, at *11 (N.D. Ill. June 3, 2002).
85
Id. at *11-12.
86
Id.
87
Id. at *12.
88
Id.
81
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In the $30 million contract litigation AAB Joint Venture v. United
States, the plaintiff contended that the defendant’s policies called for
the creation of certain relevant e-mails and other substantial documentation and that this information would likely exist in the defen89
dant’s backup tapes. The defendant conceded that some relevant emails were presumably located on the backup tapes but balked at the
90
$85,000 to $150,000 restoration cost and argued that other allegedly
91
pertinent documents likely did not exist on the backup tapes at all.
Citing McPeek, the court ordered the defendant, at its own expense, to
restore all of the pertinent e-mails because the costs of discovery were
small compared to the potential damages and the likelihood of unco92
vering relevant information was high. Finding that the plaintiff had
“provided no clear evidence to indicate that [the other] relevant docu93
ments [were] likely to be contained in the backup tapes,” however, the
94
court ordered only one-fourth of the other backup tapes produced.
In Oxford House, Inc. v. City of Topeka, Kansas, the plaintiffs requested restoration of the city’s deleted e-mails from backup tapes
95
that were recycled every six weeks. Applying the marginal utility test,
the court compared the “minimal” efficacy of finding relevant, nonoverwritten information on these tapes with the prohibitive $100,000
96
restoration cost. The low marginal utility of conducting the discov97
ery led the court to deny the plaintiff’s motion to compel.
These cases evidence the advantages and drawbacks of the marginal utility test. The test does not explicitly consider the resources of
the parties, and it subjugates economic considerations to the predominant question of whether the proposed discovery would be likely to
reveal relevant data. If a plaintiff can make a strong showing that storage tapes would contain specific e-mails, as in AAB Joint Venture, the
98
discovery will be ordered unless the cost is remarkably prohibitive.
Though this test is effective in precluding marginally worthless discov89

75 Fed. Cl. 432, 438, 442 (2007).
Id. at 439.
91
Id. at 438.
92
Id. at 443.
93
Id.
94
Id. at 444.
95
No. 06-4004, 2007 WL 1246200, at *3 (D. Kan. Apr. 27, 2007).
96
Id. at *4-5.
97
Id. at *5.
98
See AAB Joint Venture v. United States, 75 Fed. Cl. 432, 438, 442-43 (2007) (ordering discovery of storage tapes that defendants conceded might have relevant information despite a $150,000 restoration cost).
90
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ery, it is not an effective cost-shifting test. Courts that purported to apply the McPeek test supplemented it with additional factors, such as the
99
cost of discovery compared to potential damages and the specificity
100
of plaintiff’s requests, as a way to curtail overbroad discovery.
By failing to explicitly consider the parties’ resources and economic
costs, the test also diverges from the economic concept of marginal utility that it seeks to embody. Marginal utility theory envisions that a buyer and a seller arrive at a price at which each party believes it is subjectively obtaining more utility than is provided by the money or product it
101
is giving up. Discovery is not a voluntary transaction, however; defendants typically receive no value from even small self-productions. Framing the issue as whether the litigation as a whole obtains some objective
utility from the discovery of more documents at the expense of a single
party contradicts marginal utility theory’s emphasis on the preferences
of the specific parties to the transaction. The marginal utility test does
not focus on a particular party’s ability to control costs or the relative
benefit to the respondent in producing the data. These limitations
102
help explain why Magistrate Judge James Francis in Rowe and District
103
Judge Shira Scheindlin in Zubulake adopted marginal utility—the likelihood of discovering critical information—as a relevant factor in their
tests but supplemented it with additional factors.
B. The Rowe Test and Discovery Protocol
A year after McPeek v. Ashcroft, Magistrate Judge James Francis of
the Southern District of New York developed an eight-factor test that
was “hailed as the ‘gold standard’ of cost allocation adjudication” be104
fore the Zubulake analysis supplanted it.
Rowe Entertainment, Inc. v.

99

See, e.g., id.
See, e.g., Byers v. Ill. State Police, No. 99-8105, 2002 WL 1264004, at *11-12
(N.D. Ill. June 3, 2002).
101
See generally Robert D. Cooter, The Best Right Laws: Value Foundations of the Economic Analysis of Law, 64 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 817 (1989) (advocating for a legal system
premised on the concept of Pareto efficiency).
102
See Rowe Entm’t, Inc. v. William Morris Agency, Inc., 205 F.R.D. 421, 430
(S.D.N.Y. 2002) (adopting, from the McPeek marginal utility test, the likelihood of a
successful search as its second factor).
103
See Zubulake v. UBS Warburg LLC, 217 F.R.D. 309, 323 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (stating
that the first two factors, (1) the extent to which the request is specifically tailored to
discover relevant information and (2) the availability of such information from other
sources, “compris[e] the marginal utility test” and “are the most important”).
104
Kenneth J. Withers, Electronically Stored Information: The December 2006 Amendments
to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 4 NW. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 171, 183 (2006).
100
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William Morris Agency, Inc. also developed an accompanying discovery
protocol whose plaintiff-friendly attributes raise additional concerns
about cost shifting.
1. The Eight-Factor Rowe Test
In Rowe, black concert promoters contended that they were excluded from concerts with white bands through discriminatory and
105
anticompetitive practices by booking agencies and other promoters.
106
107
As is common in discrimination and antitrust actions, the plaintiffs
propounded sweeping discovery requests costing upwards of $9.75
108
million for just one of the several defendants. After finding that the
type of e-mails sought was discoverable, Judge Francis set out a costshifting test premised on eight factors:
(1) the specificity of the discovery requests;
(2) the likelihood of discovering critical information;
(3) the availability of such information from other sources;
(4) the purposes for which the responding party maintains the requested data;
(5) the relative benefit to the parties of obtaining the information;
(6) the total cost associated with production;
(7) the relative ability of each party to control costs and its incentive to
do so; and
(8) the resources available to each party.

109

The first factor seeks to penalize overbroad requests when a party
does not identify any specific factual issue that the discovery would
105

Rowe, 205 F.R.D. at 423.
In the employment context, plaintiffs will typically prove discrimination using
indirect evidence, which necessitates reviewing broad collections of e-mails to piece
together discriminatory intent. See, e.g., Hoffman v. Caterpillar, Inc., 256 F.3d 568, 576
(7th Cir. 2001) (“Direct evidence cases . . . are very rare in the employment discrimination context because employers are generally very careful to avoid statements that suggest discriminatory intent—whether their true intentions are discriminatory or not.”).
107
See, e.g., Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 558-59 (2007) (“[I]t is one
thing to be cautious before dismissing an antitrust complaint in advance of discovery,
but quite another to forget that proceeding to antitrust discovery can be expensive.”
(citation omitted)).
108
See Rowe, 205 F.R.D. at 425 (explaining the potential cost to William Morris
Agency, Inc. of cataloging, restoring, and processing e-mails if the e-mails on all backup tapes needed to be produced).
109
Id. at 429.
106
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help to prove. The next factor comes from McPeek’s marginal utility
test. The third factor shifts costs when “equivalent information either
has already been made available or is accessible in a different format
at less expense,” and is typically relevant when plaintiffs request elec110
tronic conversion of documents given to them in hard copy.
The fourth factor, the purposes for which the responding party
maintains the requested data, is curious. Ironically, after criticizing
the “cost of doing business” argument advanced in Daewoo Electronics
111
Co. v. United States, Judge Francis cited the case to establish a distinction between files kept for a business purpose (weighing against cost
shifting) and those maintained strictly for disaster-recovery purposes
112
(favoring cost shifting).
The fifth factor seeks to maintain costs with the defendant when
the restoration would bring her technical advantages—such as spurring her to create a program that she could use to search her data in
the future—or litigation advantages (e.g., if there is a high likelihood
113
that the restored files would help her own claims and defenses).
The total cost of the production, the sixth factor, is somewhat vague as
114
a stand-alone factor. Judge Francis cited cases finding that a sub115
116
stantial burden existed for expenditures of $16,000, $5000, and
117
even $1680.
The seventh factor, the ability of each party to control costs, has a
structural quirk causing it to lean toward cost shifting in nearly every
case. Plaintiffs arguing that a defendant’s cost estimates are inflated
typically offer less expensive alternatives in order to win the sixth factor. They are then seen as being better able to control costs, however,
110

Id. at 430 (citing Anti-Monopoly, Inc. v. Hasbro, Inc., No. 94-2120, 1996 WL
22976 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 23, 1996)).
111
See supra text accompanying note 37.
112
See Rowe, 205 F.R.D. at 430-31 (“If a party maintains electronic data for the purpose of utilizing it in connection with current activities, it may be expected to respond
to discovery requests at its own expense . . . [but] a party that happens to retain vestigial data for no current business purpose, but only in a case of an emergency . . . should
not be put to the expense of producing it.” (citation omitted)).
113
See id. at 431 (concluding that “[w]here the responding party itself benefits
from the production, there is less rationale for shifting costs to the requesting party”).
114
See id.
115
See Oppenheimer Fund, Inc. v. Sanders, 437 U.S. 340, 361-62 (1978) (finding
that “a threshold expense of $16,000 . . . hardly can be viewed as an insubstantial burden” on a defendant whose assets exceeded $500 million).
116
See Anti-Monopoly, Inc. v. Hasbro, Inc., 1996-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) ¶ 71,294, at
76,345 (S.D.N.Y. 1996).
117
See id.
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and lose the seventh factor, as the plaintiffs did in Rowe.
Plaintiffs
are also nearly always deemed to be in the best position to incrementally “calibrate their discovery based on the information obtained
from initial sampling” and decide whether further searches would be
119
justified.
The last factor improves on the marginal utility test by inquiring
into each party’s ability to pay, even if the costs are modest in absolute
120
terms. Without specifying whether any one factor is more important
than another, Judge Francis found that, in the case under his consideration, the results tipped heavily toward shifting all the recovery costs
121
to the plaintiffs.
Courts substantively applied The Rowe analysis in at least three
122
other cases.
The most important pattern evident from the cases is
that mechanical application of the test skewed the result toward cost
123
shifting.
Indeed, all of the reported decisions identified through
this Comment’s survey that applied the Rowe test shifted costs. As
pointed out by commentators,
[I]n many instances, at least four factors—the purposes of retention,
benefit to the parties, total costs, and ability to control costs—will favor
the responding party. If courts simply conduct an absolute comparison
of the eight Rowe factors, the responding party [would] need to attain

118

See Rowe, 205 F.R.D. at 431-32 (“The plaintiffs have professed an ability to limit
the costs of discovery of e-mails to a much greater extent than defendants. Of course,
this factor alone does not dictate cost-shifting; the defendants could be required to pay
the bill for the less expensive methodologies proposed by the plaintiffs.”).
119
Id. at 432.
120
See id. (noting that without cost shifting, the cost of production could outstrip
one party’s resources).
121
Id.
122
See Computer Assocs. Int’l, Inc. v. Quest Software, Inc., No. 02-4721, 2003 WL
21277129, at *1-2 (N.D. Ill. June 3, 2003) (declining to shift costs for the defendant’s
privilege review prior to disclosure of redacted image devices to the plaintiffs); Medtronic Sofamor Danek, Inc. v. Michelson, 229 F.R.D. 550, 553-58 (W.D. Tenn. 2003)
(shifting costs for restoration of those storage tapes least likely to contain relevant information); Murphy Oil USA, Inc. v. Fluor Daniel, Inc., No. 99-3564, 2002 WL 246439,
at *6-7 (E.D. La. Feb. 19, 2002) (shifting all costs to the requesting party and adopting
the Rowe analysis); see also In re Livent, Inc. Noteholders Sec. Litig., No. 98-7161, 2003
WL 23254, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 2, 2003) (“[T]he attorneys should read Magistrate Judge
Francis’s opinion in [Rowe]. Then Deloitte and plaintiffs should confer, in person or by
telephone, and discuss the eight factors listed in that opinion.” (citation omitted)).
123
See Zubulake v. UBS Warburg LLC, 217 F.R.D. 309, 320 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (“Indeed,
of the handful of reported opinions that apply Rowe or some modification thereof, all of
them have ordered the cost of discovery to be shifted to the requesting party.”).
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124

just one more factor to shift the costs to the requesting party.

Often, the first or second factor tipped the scales. Courts saw the
125
plaintiff’s requests as too broad, or the plaintiff failed to prove that
the backup tapes contained some reasonably high percentage of rele126
Interestingly, all of the judges that have applied Rowe
vant e-mails.
have held the third factor—the resources available to each party—to
127
be neutral, without extended discussion.
In fact, the Rowe court itself did not provide any record of the specific assets and resources
available to plaintiffs and defendants.
In addition to criticizing Rowe for favoring cost shifting in close
calls where the traditional presumption against cost shifting should
instead prevail, some courts have also faulted the Rowe test for being
incomplete, encouraging mechanical counting of the factors, and failing to guide the courts toward developing a full factual record
128
through sampling. In the influential Zubulake decision, Judge Shira
Scheindlin of the Southern District of New York pointed out that the
test also improperly omitted two factors specified in the thencontrolling Rule 26(b)(2)(iii) language under the 2000 amendments:
the amount in controversy and the importance of the issues at stake in
129
Judge Scheindlin also contended that Rowe’s fourth
the litigation.
factor, the purposes for retaining the data, had little relevance to the
130
accessibility and cost of ESI.
The Rowe test spurred two trends common to other cost-shifting
tests: a lack of uniformity in application and an increased willingness
by courts to order potentially irrelevant and costly discovery supplemented by cost shifting. The Medtronic decision symbolizes both trends.
In this trade secrets case, the defendant moved for production by the
plaintiff of nearly 1000 backup tapes, seeking e-mails that the plaintiff
124

ADAM I. COHEN & DAVID J. LENDER, ELECTRONIC DISCOVERY: LAW AND PRAC§ 5.05(C), at 5-30 (2010).
125
See, e.g., Medtronic, 229 F.R.D. at 554-55 (“Michelson has not specifically limited
his requests by date, despite his apparent understanding that tapes from 1997 to 2000
are those most likely to reveal the electronic mail he seeks . . . . [T]his factor weighs in
favor of Michelson bearing part of the production cost.”).
126
See, e.g., Murphy Oil, 2002 WL 246439, at *5 (noting that without evidence that
“the e-mails are likely to be a gold mine,” the mere inference that e-mails may reflect
more candor than hard-copy documents suggests that the marginal value of searching
e-mails on backup tapes was modest at best (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Rowe, 205 F.R.D. at 430)).
127
See, e.g., Medtronic, 229 F.R.D. at 558.
128
See, e.g., Zubulake, 217 F.R.D. at 320 (discussing the Rowe test’s drawbacks).
129
Id. at 321; see also FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(2)(iii) (2000).
130
Zubulake, 217 F.R.D. at 321-22.
TICE
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131

conceded may have existed on some post-1997 tapes.
The expense
was estimated as being in “the range of several million” dollars, which
132
represented about two percent of the amount at issue in the suit.
The court began by determining that the requesting party, Michelson, failed the specificity and marginal utility factors. Michelson
asked for information prior to 1997, “despite his apparent understanding that tapes from 1997 to 2000 are those most likely to reveal
133
the electronic mail he seeks.”
Michelson could identify only seven
relevant pages out of a million pages previously produced, diminish134
ing the likelihood of finding many relevant e-mails.
Thus far, the
court’s analysis appears straightforward. During its evaluation of the
fourth Rowe factor, which is intended to shift costs if the backup tapes
were intended only for disaster recovery, however, the court applied
135
McPeek’s marginal utility test. The court implied that if there were a
showing that the backup tapes contained relevant information, this
136
factor itself would count against cost shifting. This doubled the effect
of Rowe’s second factor, which incorporates the marginal utility test.
The court also curiously determined that both parties would benefit
from obtaining the information, although the producing party asserted “that it has not yet searched the backup tapes for litigationrelated data and, because of the expense involved, would be unlikely
137
to do so unless compelled by court order.”
Finding that cost shifting was generally appropriate in the case, the
court determined the amount based on the dates of the tapes. For data
on one set of tapes from 1997 to 2002, the requesting party had to pay
138
forty percent of the restoration costs. Another set of tapes from 1997
through the production date would be disclosed upon Michelson’s
payment of all restoration costs, as well as all of the opposing party’s re-

131

Medtronic, 229 F.R.D. at 553.
Id. at 558.
133
Id. at 554-55.
134
Id. at 555.
135
See id. at 557 (“Because Michelson has made no showing that the entire spectrum of backup tapes will contain information relevant [to] the cause’s claims or defenses, this factor weighs in favor of shifting production costs to Michelson, the requesting party.”).
136
Id.
137
Id. Curiously, the court concluded “that the parties will equally benefit from
the electronic discovery, and this factor does not sway the cost-shifting analysis in favor
of either party.” Id.
138
Id. at 560-61.
132
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levance review expenses and half of its privilege-review expenses. Michelson could obtain a third set of tapes created on or before December 31, 1996, by paying one hundred percent of the recovery, relevance140
review, and privilege-review costs. Thus, although Michelson himself
conceded that there would be little relevant information on the 1996
tape, he was permitted to probe its contents simply by reimbursing the
defendant’s expenses. Decisions like Medtronic illustrate the troublesome pattern of courts ordering discovery accompanied by cost shifting
141
when perhaps no discovery should be ordered at all.
2. The Plaintiff-Friendly Rowe Discovery Protocol
Although primarily known for its cost-shifting analysis, the Rowe
decision also provided an influential (and plaintiff-friendly) discovery
protocol. Under this protocol, (1) the plaintiffs designate a forensic
expert subject to the defendant’s objections and a confidentiality order; (2) the expert creates a mirror image of the backup tapes; (3) the
plaintiffs formulate a search procedure to which the defendants may
object; (4) the plaintiffs’ lawyers or their experts conduct the searches
and review them on an “attorneys’ eyes only” basis, which does not
constitute any waiver of privilege or confidentiality; (5) the plaintiffs
provide hard-copy e-mails that they consider material to the defendants, after which point the defendants pay their own costs for electronically converting or modifying the information; and (6) the defendants review the selected pool of documents and lodge confidentiality
142
and privilege objections. Alternatively, a defendant can review its database at its own expense; remove privileged, confidential, and irrelevant files; and produce a redacted mirror image to the plaintiffs, after
143
which the remaining process would continue from step three.
144
This protocol, cited approvingly in at least two cases, eliminates
the defendant’s previous Hobson’s choice of paying for restoration or
139

Id. at 562.
Id.
141
See infra Part IV (discussing the optimal cost-shifting framework).
142
See Rowe Entm’t, Inc. v. William Morris Agency, Inc., 205 F.R.D. 421, 433
(S.D.N.Y. 2002).
143
Id.
144
See Gambale v. Deutsche Bank AG, No. 02-4791, 2002 WL 31655326, at *1
(S.D.N.Y. Nov. 21, 2002) (adopting a slightly modified Rowe protocol but leaving it
open for further modification upon agreement of both parties); Murphy Oil USA, Inc.
v. Fluor Daniel, Inc., No. 99-3564, 2002 WL 246439, at *4-10 (E.D. La. Feb. 19, 2002)
(shifting all costs to the requesting party and adopting the Rowe protocol). But see
Cognex Corp. v. Electro Scientific Indus., Inc., No. 01-10287, 2002 WL 32309413, at *3140
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settling the case, but it replaces it with another one: giving the plaintiff
unfettered access to storage tapes containing the entirety of the defendant’s business records, or paying for the restoration itself in order to
145
The advantages to the requesting
redact confidential information.
parties, who are typically plaintiffs, are apparent. A wealthy plaintiff
would eagerly volunteer to pay the expenses if it meant getting access
to the defendant’s entire business and e-mail records, thereby getting a
firsthand look at any documents that the defendant may later claw
back as privileged. Although plaintiffs would not be able to use those
documents at trial or be able to secure a subject-matter waiver, they
would benefit from knowing the opposite side’s strategies and business
records. And the defendant, in undertaking its own privilege review of
the immense amount of data, would still run the risk of missing impor146
tant documents and effecting a subject-matter waiver.
It would certainly be possible for a court to craft a more neutral
discovery order permitting defendants to hire their own experts, review the documents first, produce only relevant nonprivileged documents to the plaintiffs, and be reimbursed for the entire technical res147
toration costs and attorney review times.
Allowing the plaintiff’s
expert to serve at the direction of the defendant would also remove
148
some privacy worries. None of the cases surveyed for this Comment
actually followed this type of more defendant-friendly protocol. The

5 (D. Mass. July 2, 2002) (citing the Rowe decision for its “detailed discussion” of protocol but declining to compel discovery and stating that if the court were to do so, it
would permit defendants to review their own production for privilege prior to production at the plaintiff’s cost).
145
See Murphy Oil, 2002 WL 246439, at *6-8 (noting that a defendant should be
able to assert privilege—and pay for the privilege review—without having to bear the
initial cost of production).
146
Counsel reviewing millions of pages typically relies on search terms and keywords, which can miss important information. See, e.g., Victor Stanley, Inc. v. Creative
Pipe, Inc., 250 F.R.D. 251, 256-57 (D. Md. 2008) (holding that the producing party
waived attorney-client privilege for 165 inadvertently produced documents, despite
screening the production through seventy different keyword searches, because counsel
failed to conduct additional quality assurance).
147
See Cognex, 2002 WL 32309413, at *3 (citing the possibility of crafting such an
order in response to the plaintiff’s willingness to pay costs, but declining to order discovery because of the small likelihood of uncovering important relevant evidence).
148
This protocol could, of course, become susceptible to abuse from the defendant’s side. In Henry v. Quicken Loans, Inc., the plaintiffs agreed to pay for an expert
acting at the defendant’s direction to recover the defendant’s files. No. 04-40346, 2008
WL 474127, at *1 (E.D. Mich. Feb. 15, 2008). When the defendants modified the list
of search terms beyond their agreement with the plaintiffs and ran up the expert’s bill,
they became responsible for paying the additional charges. Id. at *5-6.
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closest examples are Playboy Enterprises, Inc. v. Welles, Simon Property
150
151
Group L.P. v. mySimon, Inc., and Coburn v. PN II, Inc., three cases in
which an expert, acting as an agent of the court, recovered the responding party’s information and provided it to respondent’s counsel, who
152
ran her own searches and produced relevant information. Given that
the plaintiff-friendly Rowe protocol emerged after the more defendantfriendly Playboy protocol, it appears that liberalized cost shifting in Rowe
also brought tactical protocol advantages to the plaintiffs.
C. The Zubulake Test
Laura Zubulake, a UBS sales director, was fired two months after
153
filing an Equal Employment Opportunity Commission complaint.
She sued UBS for gender discrimination and retaliation, and she propounded a discovery request for “[a]ll documents concerning any
communication by or between UBS employees concerning Plain154
UBS initially produced 100 pages of e-mails, which Zubulake
tiff.”
demonstrated were incomplete because she herself had provided ap155
proximately 450 pages of e-mail correspondence.
In what Judge
Shira Scheindlin termed “a textbook example of the difficulty of balancing the competing needs of broad discovery and manageable
costs,” Zubulake requested backup-tape recovery costing approximately $175,000 in order to uncover evidence that might lead to a verdict
156
upwards of $13 million.
Judge Scheindlin, then a member of the Advisory Committee on
Civil Rules, took the opportunity to fill in gaps left in the previous
cost-shifting tests, beginning with the previously unanswered threshold question of when it would even be appropriate to conduct a
cost-shifting analysis. Judge Scheindlin stated that “cost-shifting [under Rule 26(c)] should be considered only when electronic discovery
157
imposes an ‘undue burden or expense’ on the responding party.”
Looking to the then-controlling Rule 26(b)(2)(iii) language under
149

60 F. Supp. 2d 1050 (S.D. Cal. 1999).
194 F.R.D. 639 (S.D. Ind. 2000).
151
No. 07-00662, 2008 WL 879746 (D. Nev. Mar. 28, 2008).
152
Id. at *4-5; Simon Property, 194 F.R.D. at 641; Playboy, 60 F. Supp. 2d at 1055.
153
See Zubulake v. UBS Warburg LLC, 217 F.R.D. 309, 312 (S.D.N.Y. 2003).
154
Id. (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting the
plaintiff’s request for production).
155
Id. at 313.
156
Id. at 311-12 & n.9.
157
Id. at 318 (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 26(c)).
150
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the 2000 amendments, Judge Scheindlin noted that the burden of
discovery is “‘undue’ when it ‘outweighs its likely benefit, taking into
account the needs of the case, the amount in controversy, the parties’
resources, the importance of the issues at stake in the litigation, and the
158
importance of the proposed discovery in resolving the issues.’” Moving beyond the text of the Rules, Judge Scheindlin found that “whether
production of documents is unduly burdensome or expensive turns
primarily on whether it is kept in an accessible or inaccessible format,”
159
Inacwhich itself “turns largely on the media on which it is stored.”
cessible media comprises backup tapes and deleted data existing in
160
clusters on hard-drive space that has not yet been overwritten.
After criticizing the Rowe test for favoring cost shifting and failing
161
to encourage sampling, Judge Scheindlin developed a new analytical
framework weighing seven factors in descending order:
1. The extent to which the request is specifically tailored to discover relevant information;
2. The availability of such information from other sources;
3. The total cost of production, compared to the amount in controversy;
4. The total cost of production, compared to the resources available to
each party;
5. The relative ability of each party to control costs and its incentive to
do so;
6. The importance of the issues at stake in the litigation; and
7. The relative benefits to the parties of obtaining the information.

162

Cautioning that the test should not be applied in “check-list” fashion,
Judge Scheindlin placed the most weight on the first two factors,
163
The next three
which were derived from the marginal utility test.
factors addressed the expense of the production. Judge Scheindlin
noted that the sixth factor, measuring the importance of the litigation
164
When it does,
for the broader public, will rarely come into play.

158

Id. (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(2)(iii) (2000)).
Id.
160
Id. at 318-20.
161
See supra text accompanying notes 128-30.
162
Zubulake, 217 F.R.D. at 322.
163
Id. at 322-23.
164
Id. at 323. Courts applying Zubulake thus far have held that employment discrimination, manipulation of the securities market, and intellectual property disputes
do not raise important public issues.
159
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165

however, it can predominate over others. The last factor is the “least
important because it is fair to presume that the response to a discov166
ery request generally benefits the requesting party.” When the production also benefits the responding party, however, this factor weighs
167
against cost shifting.
Judge Scheindlin stressed the importance of sampling, first seen
in McPeek, to develop a factual record that would support a more in168
formed application of the test.
To that end, UBS was ordered to
produce all responsive e-mails from its accessible active space and all
e-mails from any five inaccessible backup tapes selected by Zubu169
The sampling revealed 1541 e-mails, of which 600 were
lake.
170
deemed nonprivileged and responsive to Zubulake’s request.
In her opinion following the sampling, Judge Scheindlin applied
171
her cost-shifting test.
The marginal utility factors tipped slightly
against cost shifting because a full 68 of the 600 e-mails produced in
the sample demonstrated a “hostile relationship” between the plaintiff
and her supervisor, although none evidenced direct gender discrimi172
nation. The economic factors also leaned against cost shifting. The
cost of the remaining production, $165,955, was dwarfed by Zubulake’s potential recovery, which ranged from $1.27 million to $19.23
173
Judge
million, depending on which party’s estimate was correct.
Scheindlin found, however, that the relative ability of each party to
control costs in this case—a factor that invariably favored cost shifting
in the Rowe decisions—was neutral because the sample did not allow
174
Analyzing the
Zubulake to reduce her already-targeted search list.
importance of the issues at stake in the litigation, Judge Scheindlin
stated that employment discrimination litigation is not sufficiently important to tip the factor one way or another. Lastly, as is typically the

165

Id. Judge Scheindlin suggested this factor might be triggered by “toxic tort
class actions, environmental actions, so-called ‘impact’ or social reform litigation, cases
involving criminal conduct, or cases implicating important legal or constitutional questions.” Id. at 321.
166
Id. at 323.
167
Id.
168
Id. at 323-24.
169
Id. at 324.
170
Zubulake v. UBS Warburg LLC, 216 F.R.D. 280, 282 (S.D.N.Y. 2003).
171
Id. at 284-91.
172
Id. at 285-86.
173
Id. at 287-88.
174
Id. at 288.
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case, Zubulake would benefit more from the production than the
175
producing party would.
Interestingly, although only the last—and “least important”—
factor favored cost shifting, Judge Scheindlin ordered Zubulake to pay
176
twenty-five percent of the remaining restoration costs. She reasoned
that the factors cutting against cost shifting did so “only slightly” and
that the plaintiff “[had] not been able to show that there [was] indis177
Unlike previous costpensable evidence on those backup tapes.”
shifting opinions, Judge Scheindlin’s decision explained what determined the amount shifted: after beginning with the presumption that
the responding party pays its own costs, the amount of cost shifting
should correlate to the extent of speculation that the search would be
successful, although the “analysis of [the test’s other] factors does in178
form the exercise of discretion.”
The “watershed” Zubulake decision quickly became regarded as
179
the “most thorough treatment of cost-shifting under federal law.”
180
The test was applied without modifications in at least three cases,
181
modified slightly in two, and even used in some nonelectronic dis182
Zubulake was also successful in prompting more
covery contexts.
courts to use sampling in order to determine whether the plaintiff

175

Id. at 289.
Id. at 289 & n.75 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Zubulake v. UBS
Warburg LLC, 217 F.R.D. 309, 323 (S.D.N.Y. 2003)).
177
Id. at 289.
178
Id.
179
Mazza, supra note 68, ¶ 101, at 51.
180
See Hagemeyer N. Am., Inc. v. Gateway Data Scis. Corp., 222 F.R.D. 594, 602-03
(E.D. Wis. 2004) (ordering a sampling of backup tapes prior to full analysis); OpenTV
v. Liberate Techs., 219 F.R.D. 474, 479 (N.D. Cal. 2003) (ordering fifty-percent cost
shifting when factors four and seven favored cost shifting); Xpedior Creditor Trust v.
Credit Suisse First Boston (USA), Inc., 309 F. Supp. 2d 459, 466-67 (S.D.N.Y. 2003)
(ordering the defendant to pay its own costs when it could benefit from the production in other litigation).
181
See Quinby v. WestLB AG, 245 F.R.D. 94, 104 (S.D.N.Y. 2006) (applying the Zubulake analysis only to those inaccessible documents that the defendant should have
reasonably foreseen would be discoverable prior to committing them to backup tapes,
and shifting thirty percent of the costs); Wiginton v. CB Richard Ellis, Inc., 229 F.R.D.
568, 572-73 (N.D. Ill. 2004) (considering the importance of the requested discovery in
resolving the issues of the litigation, in addition to the Zubulake factors).
182
See Multitech. Servs., L.P. v. Verizon Sw., No. 02-0702, 2004 WL 1553480, at *1-2
(N.D. Tex. July 12, 2004) (applying a modified six-factor Zubulake test for interrogatory
answers).
176
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met the marginal utility factors and whether the defendant credibly
183
argued that the costs were too high.
This success did not come without some criticism. Some commentators critiqued the theoretical predominance of the first two factors, arguing that even a narrowly tailored request might be so expensive as to dwarf the total amount of recovery, especially in employment
184
litigation.
Speaking five years after the Zubulake decision, Judge
Francis remained “resistant to the hierarchy approach because [of]
fear . . . that the factor at the top of the hierarchy will almost always
185
wash out the other factors.”
But the concern that plaintiffs might overwhelmingly force expensive restorations on defendants as long as they present some likelihood of finding relevant files has not been borne out in practice. In
Zubulake itself, the plaintiff was ordered to reimburse 25% of UBS’s
expenses despite the fact that 58.1% of the e-mails in the representative sample were relevant, including 68 e-mails that the plaintiff iden186
tified as “highly relevant.”
Similarly, in another opinion applying
the Zubulake test, OpenTV v. Liberate Technologies, the plaintiff was required to pay fifty percent of the costs although “the requested source
code [was] highly likely to contain relevant information and [was] un187
In that case, the court transferred
available from another source.”
costs despite finding that only factors four (the similar resources of the
188
189
parties) and seven (plaintiff’s greater benefit from data) weighed
in favor of that move. Although Judge Scheindlin warned that her test
“cannot be mechanically applied at the risk of losing sight of its pur-

183

See, e.g., Hagemeyer, 222 F.R.D. at 603 (restricting protective orders to instances
where sampling reveals that the request “truly threatens” to be an undue burden); Wiginton, 229 F.R.D. at 569 (using sampling to determine the likelihood of finding incriminating e-mails and, thus, of determining the distribution of discovery costs).
184
See Satterwhite & Quatrara, supra note 25, ¶ 14, at 6 (criticizing the Zubulake
test in the employment litigation context).
185
Francis, supra note 63, at 18.
186
Zubulake v. UBS Warburg LLC, 216 F.R.D. 280, 282, 285-86 (S.D.N.Y. 2003); see
also id. (agreeing with the plaintiff that the e-mails were relevant in telling “a compelling story of the dysfunctional atmosphere” at UBS but finding that none showed direct
evidence of gender discrimination).
187
219 F.R.D. 474, 478-79 (N.D. Cal. 2003).
188
See id. at 478 (noting that, unlike in Zubulake, the plaintiff was a large corporation able to fund costs).
189
Although the court determined that the plaintiff would benefit more from the
requested source code, it admitted that the code could also support the defendant’s
noninfringement arguments. Id. at 479.
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190

pose,” startling results like OpenTV indicate that the Zubulake analysis
did not bring predictability to the field.
Other critics contended that Zubulake’s presumption against cost
shifting in close calls would allow “the pendulum to swing too far in
the opposite direction,” particularly in employment discrimination
191
disputes. Practitioner Rodney Satterwhite warned that “[w]hen the
majority of the factors deemed most important are inherently adverse
to the employer, even assuming good-faith discovery practices on the
part of the plaintiff, the potential impact on litigation is significant
192
Plaintiffs acting in bad faith, moreover, would
and dangerous.”
once again be able to resort to weapons of mass discovery in their
quest to force settlements.
But the reported decisions in this Comment’s survey suggest that
despite criticizing Rowe’s liberal cost shifting, the Zubulake test did not
193
substantially decrease the practice. In fact, in all but one of the cases applying Zubulake, some costs were shifted to the plaintiff. The one
outlier, Xpedior Creditor Trust v. Credit Suisse First Boston (USA), Inc., adjudicated by Judge Scheindlin, involved the unusual circumstance of a
defendant who would benefit from the restoration of its documents in
194
a related litigation. The primary difference between the Xpedior and
Zubulake analyses was that both parties equally benefited from the restoration in Xpedior, while only the plaintiff did so in Zubulake. This difference in the “least important factor” produced wildly divergent results: imposing $41,488 out of a total $165,955 in expenses on
195
individual plaintiff Laura Zubulake but protecting a corporate plaintiff from cost shifting of any portion of its demanded $400,000 discov196
ery. These opinions demonstrate the inherently fluid and imprecise
application of any cost-shifting test, even by the tests’ creators.
No decisions applying Zubulake in this Comment’s survey denied
the requesting party’s discovery requests, even when there was a very

190

Zubulake v. UBS Warburg LLC, 217 F.R.D. 309, 323 (S.D.N.Y. 2003).
Satterwhite & Quatrara, supra note 25, ¶ 19, at 9.
192
Id.
193
See cases discussed supra notes 180-82.
194
See 309 F. Supp. 2d 459, 466-67 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (“This may be the rare case where
both parties benefit from production. Although Xpedior obviously benefits more . . .
CSFB would have been required to restore many of the same systems in connection with
its production obligations in [related litigation]. This factor therefore is neutral.”).
195
Zubulake v. UBS Warburg LLC, 216 F.R.D. 280, 283, 289 (S.D.N.Y. 2003).
196
Xpedior, 309 F. Supp. 2d at 466-67.
191
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small likelihood that relevant data would be restored.
Therefore,
like the Rowe test, Zubulake did not reduce tremendous discovery costs;
it merely redistributed them. Its most enduring legacy did not become apparent until 2006, when Rule 26(b)(2) created the two-tiered
discovery system premised on accessible and inaccessible data.
III. RULE 26(B)(2) AND THE 2006 E-DISCOVERY AMENDMENTS
The cost-shifting tests described in Part II helped to ascertain
whether the responding party showed “good cause” under Rule 26(c)
to obtain a protective order. Several judges, including Judge Scheindlin, stated that “good cause” could also be shown by demonstrating
that the plaintiff’s request ran “afoul of the Rule 26(b)(2) proportio198
nality test.” Through amendments in 2000 and 2006, Rule 26(b)(2)
became increasingly important in guiding cost-shifting analyses and
199
has arguably displaced the other tests. The following Section details
Rule 26(b)(2)’s impact on cost-shifting analysis before and after the
amendments and concludes that although the 2006 electronic discovery amendments did not bring uniformity to the field of cost-shifting
decisions, they helped decrease the practice of cost shifting.
A. Rule 26(b)(2) Prior to the 2006 Amendments
The last major change to Rule 26 prior to the 2006 amendments
occurred in 2000. Faced with the prospect of rising discovery costs
due to the explosion in e-discovery, the Advisory Committee on Civil
Rules successfully proposed an amendment to Rule 26(b)(1), which
had permitted discovery relevant to any “subject matter involved in
197

See, e.g., Wiginton v. CB Richard Ellis, Inc., 229 F.R.D. 568, 575, 577 (N.D. Ill.
2004) (compelling discovery with 75% of the costs shifted on plaintiff when sampling revealed that the number of relevant e-mails would be “substantially lower than 4.5%”).
198
Zubulake, 216 F.R.D. at 283; see also Thompson v. U.S. Dep’t of Hous. & Urban
Dev., 219 F.R.D. 93, 98 (D. Md. 2003) (stating that, in addition to the marginal utility,
Rowe, and Zubulake tests, “it also can be argued with some force that the Rule 26(b)(2)
balancing factors are all that is needed to allow a court to reach a fair result when considering the scope of discovery of electronic records”).
199
See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(2)(iii) (2000) (permitting judges to limit the frequency or extent of discovery by weighing the “burden or expense of the proposed discovery [against] its likely benefit, taking into account the needs of the case, the amount in
controversy, the parties’ resources, the importance of the issues at stake in the litigation, and the importance of the proposed discovery in resolving the issues”). Following the 2006 amendments, this proportionality test became a guide for evaluating
whether parties showed “good cause” when requesting information that “is not reasonably accessible because of undue burden or cost.” FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(2)(B); see also
infra Section III.B.
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the [pending] action” only if the requesting party showed “good
200
cause.”
The Committee also added a sentence to Rule 26(b)(1)
“calling attention to the limitations of subdivisions (b)(2)(i), (ii), and
(iii) . . . to emphasize the need for active judicial use of subdivision
201
This cross-reference was
(b)(2) to control excessive discovery.”
needed because courts had “not implemented these limitations with
202
the vigor that was contemplated.” Subdivision (b)(2)(iii) instructed
judges to limit the frequency or extent of discovery by weighing the
“burden or expense of the proposed discovery” against its “likely benefit, taking into account the needs of the case, the amount in controversy, the parties’ resources, the importance of the issues at stake in
the litigation, and the importance of the proposed discovery in resolv203
ing the issues.”
The reminder to control excessive discovery worked in a way perhaps unintended by the Advisory Committee. Whereas few courts or204
dered cost shifting under Rule 26(b)(2) prior to 2000, the practice
became more common following the adoption of the 2000 amend205
ments. Courts were particularly likely to order discovery and to shift
costs for forensic recovery of deleted files from active hard-drive space
206
for which the requesting party offered to pay. Some courts even came
to expect the plaintiff to offer to pay for particularly burdensome dis207
covery. They did not, however, deny many more expensive discovery

200

FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(1) (2000) advisory committee’s note to 2000 amendments; see also id. (“The good-cause standard warranting broader discovery is meant to
be flexible.”).
201
Id.; see also FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(1) (2000) (“All discovery is subject to the limitations imposed by Rule 26(b)(2)(i), (ii), and (iii).”).
202
FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(1) (2000) advisory committee’s note to 2000 amendments.
203
FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(1) (2000).
204
See supra note 65 and accompanying text (finding only two decisions ordering
e-discovery cost shifting prior to 2000, in both of which the requesting party offered to
pay).
205
See supra note 23 (finding that, in a survey of twenty-eight cases between 2000
and 2006, courts ordered cost shifting on a requesting party at least eleven times, and
on eight of these occasions the requesting party contested the order).
206
See, e.g., Antioch Co. v. Scrapbook Borders, Inc., 210 F.R.D. 645, 653-54 (D.
Minn. 2002) (permitting the plaintiff to search the defendant’s computers for deleted
files at the plaintiff’s own expense); Simon Prop. Group L.P. v. mySimon, Inc., 194
F.R.D. 639, 641 (S.D. Ind. 2000) (same); Playboy Enters., Inc. v. Welles, 60 F. Supp. 2d
1050, 1054 (S.D. Cal. 1999) (same).
207
See, e.g., Cook v. Deloitte & Touche, LLP, No. 03-3926, 2005 WL 2429422, at
*16 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 30, 2005) (declining the plaintiff’s request for additional information from the defendant’s accessible electronic personnel database because he did not
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requests altogether, at least in the decisions identified in this Com208
ment’s survey. Instead, it appears some judges relied on cost shifting
209
as a tool that allowed them to permit more discovery with less guilt.
B. The 2006 Electronic Discovery Amendments
The amendments to Rules 16, 26, 33, 34, 37, and 45 that became ef210
fective on December 1, 2006, addressed electronic discovery. As the
culmination of a decade-long Discovery Project by the Judicial Confe211
rence Advisory Committee on Rules of Civil Procedure, the amendments sought to reduce the expense of e-discovery on producing parties, offer enduring technology-neutral guidance to judges on ESI, and
bring some measure of uniformity to disparate pockets of common law
212
New Rule 26(b)(2) created a
in many areas, including cost shifting.
two-tiered system of discovery that made inaccessible data presumptively
213
undiscoverable.
The presumption could be overcome by a showing
214
of “good cause.” “Good cause” analysis involved balancing seven factors listed in Rule 26(b)(2)’s advisory note—factors that courts also be215
gan applying to cost-shifting determinations.
provide sufficient evidence that the relevant files had not been previously produced,
“nor [did] he volunteer[] to foot the bill for doing so”).
208
This observation is limited to the cases in my survey, whose methodology is described supra note 23. Since the Westlaw search was intended to locate decisions discussing cost shifting, the search may have excluded many cases in which judges did in
fact reject expensive discovery and did not even comment on possible cost shifting. A
comprehensive survey of all electronic discovery decisions would be necessary to identify such a trend.
209
See supra Part II (describing courts’ willingness to order discovery in combination
with cost shifting). A notable exception to this trend is evident in Cognex Corp. v. Electro
Scientific Indus., Inc., No. 01-10287, 2002 WL 32309413 (D. Mass. July 2, 2002). The court
denied discovery despite the plaintiff’s willingness to pay and warned that “[a]t some
point, the adversary system needs to say ‘enough is enough’ and recognize that the costs
of seeking every relevant piece of discovery is [sic] not reasonable. This concept is reflected in Rule 26 itself and made express in the Comments thereto.” Id. at *5.
210
See, e.g., COMM. ON RULES OF PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, SUMMARY OF THE REPORT OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE COMMITTEE ON RULES OF PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE
22 (2005) (describing the proposed amendments to Rules 16, 26, 33, 34, 37, and 45 and
revisions to Form 35 as relating to “Discovery of Electronically Stored Information”).
211
See generally Richard Marcus, Essay, Only Yesterday: Reflections on Rulemaking Responses to E-Discovery, 73 FORDHAM L. REV. 1 (2004) (situating the e-discovery amendments within the broader history of the discovery revolution).
212
See Rachel Hytken, Electronic Discovery: To What Extent Do the 2006 Amendments
Satisfy Their Purposes?, 12 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 875, 881-84 (2008).
213
FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(2)(B).
214
Id.
215
See infra subsections III.B.2-.3.
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1. The Two-Tiered System
Amended Rule 26(b)(2) borrowed heavily from Judge Scheindlin’s two-tiered discovery system, which made data production hinge
on whether the data source was reasonably accessible.
Rule
26(b)(2)(B) provides, “A party need not provide discovery of electronically stored information from sources that the party identifies as
216
not reasonably accessible because of undue burden or cost.”
Reasonably accessible relevant data fall in the first tier and must be produced. If the producing party can demonstrate, however, that the data sought are not reasonably accessible, the data are presumptively
217
The burden then shifts to the requesting party to
undiscoverable.
overcome that presumption by showing “good cause, considering the
218
limitations of Rule 26(b)(2)(C).”
New Rule 26(b)(2)(C)(iii) replicates the old proportionality test
from Rule 26(b)(2)(iii) and limits discovery to circumstances in which
the “burden or expense of the proposed discovery outweighs its likely
benefit, considering the needs of the case, the amount in controversy,
the parties’ resources, the importance of the issues at stake in the action,
219
and the importance of the proposed discovery in resolving the issues.”
There is one key difference between the two-tiered systems in
Zubulake and Rule 26(b)(2). Zubulake conditioned the finding of
“whether production of documents is unduly burdensome or expensive . . . primarily on whether it is kept in an accessible or inaccessible
220
format.”
Judge Scheindlin described three types of accessible media: (1) active, online data on hard drives, (2) near-line data that consist of robotic storage devices that are quickly searchable, and (3) of221
fline storage and archives like a removable optical disk. Inaccessible
data, in Judge Scheindlin’s view, consisted of sequential-access storage
216

FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(2)(B).
Although under the new Rule defendants could still incorrectly designate information as inaccessible or deliberately convert it to inaccessible form, the amendment was
deemed an improvement over prior practice (in which defendants simply ignored the
discovery requests) by requiring the responding party to identify the sources of potentially responsive information that it is not searching or producing because of cost. See ADVISORY COMM. ON FED. RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, PROPOSED RULE AMENDMENTS OF SIGNIFICANT INTEREST 5 (2005), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/rules/supct1105/
Controversial_Report.pdf.
218
FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(2)(B).
219
Id. 26(b)(2)(C).
220
Zubulake v. UBS Warburg LLC, 217 F.R.D. 309, 318 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (emphasis
omitted).
221
Id. at 318-19.
217
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devices that are not amenable to individual-document searches, like
backup tapes, and erased, fragmented, or damaged data available for
222
recovery on clusters of active space that have not been overwritten.
Rule 26(b)(2)(B), on the other hand, provides that a “party need
not provide discovery of electronically stored information from
sources that the party identifies as not reasonably accessible because of
223
undue burden or cost.”
This formulation recognizes that a poor individual defendant might still be unduly burdened even when she is
called to restore information from active hard-drive space rather than
more expensive backup tapes. Rule 26(b)(2) and its advisory notes do
not reference particular media that are more likely to present an un224
due expense. In fact, proposals to denote backup tapes as reasonably inaccessible sources were rejected in order to keep the amend225
ments open to technological progress.
It is important not to overstate the difference between the Zubulake formulation and the amended Federal Rules. During interviews
following the Zubulake case, Judge Scheindlin explained that her emphasis on media types was only meant to provide general guidelines as
to what types of media typically present an undue burden, permitting
226
exceptions.
Whether intended or not, however, the surface distinction between Zubulake and Rule 26(b)(2) has led to divergent treatment by
the courts. In W.E. Aubuchon Co. v. BeneFirst, LLC, the court noted
that although active servers are considered “accessible” under Judge
Scheindlin’s approach, the restoration cost in that particular case
made them “not reasonably accessible within the meaning of [Rule]
227
26(b)(2)(B).”
Other judges have adhered to Zubulake’s bright-line
222

Id. at 319-20.
FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(2)(B) (emphasis added).
224
See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(2) advisory committee’s note to 2006 amendments (“It
is not possible to define in a rule the different types of technological features that may
affect the burdens and costs of accessing electronically stored information.”).
225
See, e.g., Hearing, supra note 50, at 32-34 (testimony of Joan Feldman, Computer
Forensics, Inc.) (addressing concerns over identifying backup tapes as inherently inaccessible).
226
See Ten Tips for Electronic Discovery: A Special Interview with Judge Shira A. Scheindlin, ACC DOCKET, Jan. 2005, at 56, 70-72 (stating that her one oft-quoted and criticized sentence from Zubulake, “[a] court should consider cost shifting only when electronic data is relatively inaccessible, such as in backup tapes,” should be read in
context with other language in the opinion restating the broad Rule 26(b)(2) references to “undue burden”).
227
245 F.R.D. 38, 42-43 (D. Mass. 2007); see also id. (“In this case, the records
sought by the Plaintiffs are stored on a server used by BeneFirst in Pembroke[,] Massa223
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definition of accessible and inaccessible documents even after the
2006 amendments. In Canon U.S.A., Inc. v. S.A.M., Inc., the court cited
Rule 26(b)(2)’s “undue burden” language but proceeded to assert
that “[m]achine-readable data, such as active, online, near-line, or offline data in storage or archives are accessible; however, backup tapes
228
The
and erased, fragmented, or damaged data is not accessible.”
court ordered the defendant to hire a forensic expert at the defendant’s own expense because “the requested discovery is retained on a
229
No factual record was developed
server, and therefore accessible.”
of the cost to hire such an expert and whether that cost would present
an undue burden.
Cost-shifting tests prior to the 2006 amendments sought to reduce
discovery expenses by discouraging plaintiffs from making overbroad
230
requests.
As discussed in Part II, these efforts had little effect on
wealthy plaintiffs. Moreover, courts’ willingness to grant meritless discovery in combination with cost shifting likely increased discovery costs
231
By presumptively prohibiting the production of data
altogether.
from costly inaccessible sources, the two-tiered system created by Rule
26(b)(2) lowered discovery costs rather than redistribute them. For
this reason, this Comment argues in Part IV that the optimal costshifting analysis must take into account the new two-tiered system.
2. The Advisory Note to Rule 26(b)(2)
Amended Rule 26(b)(2) instructs that data which are not reasonably accessible because of cost should not be produced absent a show232
ing of good cause.
To help determine whether good cause exists,
the rule’s advisory note introduces seven relevant factors:
(1) the specificity of the discovery request;

chusetts, which is clearly an accessible format. However, because of BeneFirst’s method of storage and lack of an indexing system, it will be extremely costly to retrieve
the requested data.”).
228
No. 07-01201, 2008 WL 2522087, at *3 (E.D. La. June 20, 2008).
229
Id. at *5.
230
See, e.g., Byers v. Ill. State Police, No. 99-8105, 2002 WL 1264004, at *11-12
(N.D. Ill. June 3, 2002) (finding that cost shifting would provide plaintiffs with an “incentive to focus their requests”).
231
For example, a responding party “protected” via cost shifting would still have to
spend thousands of dollars on reviewing for privilege a production that, in the absence
of cost shifting, may not have been ordered discoverable in the first place. See supra
text accompanying notes 144-46 (discussing the “Hobson’s choice” presented by the
Rowe discovery protocol).
232
FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(2)(B).
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(2) the quantity of information available from other and more easily accessed sources;
(3) the failure to produce relevant information that seems likely to have
existed but is no longer available on more easily accessed sources;
(4) the likelihood of finding relevant, responsive information that cannot be obtained from other, more easily accessed sources;
(5) predictions as to the importance and usefulness of the further information;
(6) the importance of the issues at stake in the litigation; and
233

(7) the parties’ resources.

The advisory note does not suggest any particular weighing of the new
factors. Though some practitioners viewed the factors as “almost
234
identical” to the Zubulake standard, perhaps because of Judge
Scheindlin’s presence on the Advisory Committee when this Rule was
developed, a closer look at the factors tells a more nuanced story.
Factors two, four, and six are nearly verbatim from Zubulake. Factors
one and seven borrow from Rowe. Factor five, the importance and
usefulness of the requested data, is imported from Wiginton v. CB Ri235
chard Ellis, Inc. Finally, factor three introduces a new, quasi-punitive
measure favoring cost shifting when a responding party converts accessible data into inaccessible formats after discovery obligations arise.
Although the advisory note significantly borrows from Rowe and Zubulake, it does not replicate all of the previous tests’ factors. Gone is the
Rowe consideration of the purposes for which parties maintain data.
The advisory note also does not reference two joint Rowe and Zubulake
factors: the relative ability of each party to control costs and the relative benefits to the parties of obtaining the information.
The fact that Rule 26(b)(2) does not reference cost shifting, and
that the seven factors in its advisory note are significantly different
from the Rowe and Zubulake tests, raises a question: are the seven
“good cause” criteria in the advisory notes intended to guide costshifting determinations? The advisory note suggests that its factors are
as applicable to cost shifting as they are to compelling discovery. It
233

FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(2) advisory committee’s note to 2006 amendments.
See, e.g., Daniel R. Murray et al., Taking a Byte Out of Discovery: How the Properties
of Electronically Stored Information Have Shaped E-Discovery Rules, 41 UCC L.J. 35, 47 n.17
(2008).
235
See Wiginton v. CB Richard Ellis, Inc., 229 F.R.D. 568, 572-73 (N.D. Ill. 2004)
(adding formally “the importance of the requested discovery in resolving the issues of
the litigation” to the Zubulake factors).
234
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reminds judges that “the good-cause inquiry and consideration of the
Rule 26(b)(2)(C) limitations are coupled with the authority to set
conditions for discovery. . . . The conditions may also include payment
by the requesting party of part or all of the reasonable costs of obtain236
ing information from sources that are not reasonably accessible.”
The advisory note further instructs that “[a] requesting party’s willingness to share or bear the access costs may be weighed by the court
in determining whether there is good cause. But the producing party’s burdens in reviewing the information for relevance and privilege
237
may weigh against permitting the requested discovery.”
The advisory note’s reference to judges’ authority to set costshifting conditions suggests that its factors may be applicable to costshifting analysis. On the other hand, it can be read as merely reminding judges that this tool exists but leaving in place prior analytical
frameworks like Rowe and Zubulake to guide cost shifting after the decision to order discovery is made. This ambiguity has carried over in
practice, with some courts applying the advisory-note factors only for
the threshold inquiry of whether good cause is shown to order the
production of inaccessible data, and others applying the factors to
238
cost shifting as well.
3. Trends from Practice
Subject to the methodology and limitations of the survey described
239
previously, the following trends are evident in cases decided after the
2006 amendments. Some courts expect the seven factors in the advi240
sory note to Rule 26(b)(2) to guide cost-shifting decisions exclusively.
236

FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(2) advisory committee’s note to 2006 amendments.
Id.
238
See infra subsection III.B.3.
239
See supra note 23. It is important to qualify once again that the findings of this
study are limited by the availability of cost-shifting decisions on the Westlaw service and
by chosen searching methodologies. Conclusions based on the roughly sixty-five costshifting decisions identified in the survey may not necessarily be representative of the
broad pool of all magistrate and district court opinions and orders. Some qualitative
and, to a lesser degree, quantitative trends can nonetheless be discerned from the decisions on Westlaw.
240
See, e.g., Best Buy Stores, L.P. v. Developers Diversified Realty Corp., 247 F.R.D.
567, 570-71 (D. Minn. 2007) (analyzing the seven factors and holding that the requesting party, who did not argue that documents were uniquely available from the respondent’s database, did not show good cause in light of the undue burden presented by a
$124,000 restoration cost); W.E. Aubuchon Co. v. BeneFirst, LLC, 245 F.R.D. 38, 41,
44-45 (D. Mass. 2007) (holding that when the plaintiffs reduced their original request
and demonstrated that the requested data would be important and would not be avail237

1562

University of Pennsylvania Law Review

[Vol. 158: 1523

Thus, in at least one case, a district judge reversed a magistrate judge’s
order that plaintiffs pay for restoring defendants’ data because it was
not apparent from the record that the magistrate engaged in the Rule
26(b)(2)(B) analysis of whether the requested information was not rea241
Other courts focus on
sonably accessible because of undue burden.
242
the proportionality test of Rule 26(b)(2)(C)(iii). They state that the
proper analysis involves balancing “the likelihood that restored documents will prove relevant to the instant litigation with whether the cost
of restoration places an undue burden on Defendant,” as provided in
243
These courts explicitly refer to the five proRule 26(b)(2)(C)(iii).
244
portionality factors in Rule 26(b)(2)(C)(iii) as “cost-shifting” factors.
Others still separate “good cause” production analyses from costshifting determinations. In In re Veeco Instruments, Inc. Securities Litigation, the plaintiff requested e-mails from backup tapes with production
245
costing up to $124,000. The court applied the seven-factor test from
the advisory note to Rule 26 to determine that plaintiff had met the
246
good cause standard and ordered defendant to produce discovery.
It noted that it would conduct a cost-shifting analysis based on Zubulake after the production, when the defendant itemized the costs in247
And in Parkdale America, LLC v. Travelers Casualty & Surety
curred.
Company of America, Inc., the court ordered production at the respondent’s expense but suggested that the parties negotiate cost shifting
while reserving the court’s ability to apportion costs in the future by
248
applying the Zubulake factors.
able from other sources, they presented sufficient “good cause” to order discovery costing $80,000 without reimbursement).
241
See Pipefitters Local No. 636 Pension Fund v. Mercer Human Res. Consulting,
Inc., No. 05-74326, 2007 WL 2080365, at *2 (E.D. Mich. July 19, 2007).
242
See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(2)(C)(iii) (authorizing the court to “limit the frequency or extent of discovery . . . if it determines that . . . the burden or expense of the proposed discovery outweighs its likely benefit, considering the needs of the case, the
amount in controversy, the parties’ resources, the importance of the issues at stake in
the action, and the importance of the discovery in resolving the issues”).
243
See AAB Joint Venture v. United States, 75 Fed. Cl. 432, 443 (2007); see also id. at
443-44 (ordering restoration of one-fourth of e-mail backup tapes for sampling at an
estimated cost of $21,000 to $37,000, which the court considered small in comparison
to the $30 million of claims at issue).
244
Semsroth v. City of Wichita, 239 F.R.D. 630, 638 (D. Kan. 2006); see also id. (concluding that due to limited expense and the plaintiffs’ inability to pay, the backup tapes
should be considered “reasonably accessible” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
245
No. 05-1695, 2007 WL 983987, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 2, 2007).
246
Id.
247
Id. at *2.
248
No. 06-0078, 2007 WL 4165247, at *13-14 (W.D.N.C. Nov. 19, 2007).
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Other courts encouraged continual negotiation between parties to
resolve discovery issues, providing voice to the 2006 amendments’
emphasis on mutual resolution of e-discovery issues in the Rule 26(f)
249
For example, as one court instructed, “To the extent
conference.
that any Party requests data that is not readily accessible, the Parties shall comply with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in determining whether the inaccessible data is to be produced and which
250
Party will bear what portion of the costs of production, if any . . . .”
The court also ordered the parties to confer about inaccessible ESI
251
prior to seeking judicial assistance.
Courts and parties have continued to be innovative in their costshifting analyses. In an employment lawsuit, Sterle v. Elizabeth Arden,
Inc., the court entered a conditional cost-shifting order agreed upon
252
by the parties. If the plaintiff uncovered any of seven specific salesperformance reports in the defendants’ computer records, the defendants would bear the costs of the inspection; otherwise the costs would
253
shift to the plaintiff.
As more cases began to implicate individual litigants’ home computers, which the requesting parties offered to search on their own
dime, courts struggled over how to account for privacy in the Rule
254
26(b)(2) analysis. At least one court ordered cost shifting based on
broad concepts of fairness and equity as opposed to any formal balancing test or concerns about accessibility. In Haka v. Lincoln County,
the example in the Introduction to this Comment, the plaintiff requested electronic documents from his former employer’s hard drive
at a cost of approximately $49,000, not including attorney review
255
The court appeared to accept the defendant’s estimate that
time.
the plaintiff’s potential recovery in the case would be “significantly
256
Neither party could prove exactly what eviless” than $100,000.
249

See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(f) (requiring parties to “discuss any issues about preserving discoverable information” at their initial conference).
250
In re Seroquel Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 1769, 2007 WL 219989, at *5 (M.D. Fla.
Jan. 26, 2007).
251
Id.
252
No. 06-01584, 2008 WL 961216, at *2 (D. Conn. Apr. 9, 2008).
253
Id.
254
See, e.g., Orrell v. Motorcarparts of Am., Inc., No. 06-0418, 2007 WL 4287750, at
*7-8 (W.D.N.C. Dec. 5, 2007) (authorizing the defendant to an employment discrimination suit to conduct a forensic examination of the plaintiff’s home computer at the
defendant’s expense because the plaintiff had given inconsistent testimony about how
she preserved files on her home computer).
255
246 F.R.D. 577, 578 (W.D. Wis. 2007).
256
Id. at 578-79.
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dence the hard drives would contain. The court framed the question
simply, “[I]s it worth it to spend tens of thousands of dollars to explore ESI that might reveal a smoking gun but is equally likely to re257
Without applying any formal balancing test,
veal nothing much?”
the judge stated that “fairness and efficiency” should require the par258
ties to split the costs evenly.
Haka demonstrates that even with more guidance from the Rules,
cost shifting remains largely dependent on each judge’s discretion.
Analytically, the result in Haka is hard to justify. The discovery was from
active hard-drive space that, at least under Zubulake, would be deemed
accessible. The court did not conclude that the $27,000 cost would be a
particularly undue hardship for the defendant county. The court ordered a plaintiff, whom it described as “a wage-earner with minimal resources,” to pay at least $13,500 for discovery sought from accessible
hard-drive space in a case where total recovery would likely be under
259
$100,000.
Although the plaintiff ultimately “swallowed hard” and
260
proceeded with discovery, the decision was economically taxing.
It should not be very surprising that courts have not uniformly
analyzed cost shifting, even in the wake of the 2006 amendments. As
discussed above, the new Rule 26(b)(2) and its advisory note do not
explicitly state that its factors are applicable to cost shifting and
should prevail over the Zubulake, Rowe, or marginal utility tests. Even
had the Rules Committee done so, magistrate judges who confront
fact-intensive inquiries in an area lacking many published decisions
would likely develop differing interpretations of Rule 26(b)(2). This
is in part because of the dearth of binding appellate decisions on the
topic. Very few courts of appeal address discovery decisions generally,
and even fewer have the opportunity to provide meaningful guidance
261
on cost shifting. Because discovery decisions are reviewed under an
262
abuse of discretion standard, appellate courts typically defer to
263
whatever formula was adopted by the lower court.
257

Id. at 579.
Id.
259
Id. at 578-79.
260
Brian Formella, a partner at the law firm of Anderson, O’Brien, Bertz, Skrenes
& Golla, which represented the plaintiff, graciously provided information on the plaintiff’s decision in a telephone interview on December 19, 2008.
261
See Blakley, supra note 11, at 40 (praising the amended rules for providing
guidance in an area where there is little appellate authority).
262
Oppenheimer Fund, Inc. v. Sanders, 437 U.S. 340, 359 (1978).
263
See, e.g., Spears v. City of Indianapolis, 74 F.3d 153, 158 (7th Cir. 1996) (affirming summarily the lower court’s order on cost shifting because “[t]he timing of the
258
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Yet while the amended Rules have not brought uniformity, this
Comment’s survey suggests that in the wake of their adoption, courts
have become more skeptical of cost shifting. They are more likely to
264
shift costs only when the requesting party volunteers to bear them or
265
when the request is made of nonparties.
Judges also increasingly
scrutinize the responding party’s attempts to use cost shifting as a
shield. Courts have refused to shift costs when defendants have failed
to adequately inform the court about the precise difficulties and costs
266
of restoring data, have precipitated the forensic issue in question by
267
failing to preserve ESI, or have engaged in deceptive discovery tac268
tics. Cost shifting has become quite rare. In fact, when those decisions in which the requesting party did not offer to pay for discovery
are excluded from the thirty-five cases addressing cost shifting post–

subpoenas, the wealth of materials sought—with the whiff of a fishing expedition apparent—and the privileged nature of many of the documents provided a sound basis
for the court to order reimbursement under [Rules 45(c) and 26(c)]”).
264
See, e.g., Thielen v. Buongiorno USA, Inc., No. 06-0016, 2007 WL 465680, at *3
(W.D. Mich. Feb. 8, 2007) (permitting the defendant company, which was sued for fraudulently enrolling the plaintiff in a cell-phone text-messaging subscription service, to image the plaintiff’s home computer at the defendant’s cost to determine whether the
plaintiff had ever heard of the defendant’s service or subscribed to it on the Internet).
265
See Guy Chem. Co. v. Romaco AG, 243 F.R.D. 310, 312-13 (N.D. Ind. 2007)
(shifting the $7200 subpoena-compliance cost to the requesting party without formal
analysis because the respondent was a nonparty).
266
See Mikron Indus., Inc. v. Hurd Windows & Doors, Inc., No. 07-0532, 2008 WL
1805727, at *2 (W.D. Wash. Apr. 21, 2008) (denying cost shifting because the defendants had not informed the court about the number of backup tapes to be searched,
the different methods the defendants use to store electronic information, the defendants’ electronic-document-retention policies, the overlap in information between
backup tapes and more accessible formats, and the extent to which the defendants had
searched ESI that remained accessible); Thompson v. U.S. Dep’t of Hous. & Urban
Dev., 219 F.R.D. 93, 99 (D. Md. 2003) (“[Defendant’s] failure to provide . . . information needed to analyze the Rule 26(b)(2) cost-benefit factors . . . predictably, resulted
in rulings that the Plaintiffs’ motions were meritorious.”).
267
See Peskoff v. Faber, 251 F.R.D. 59, 62-63 (D.D.C. 2008) (“This is a problem of
Mr. Faber’s own making and, consequently, the expense and burden of the forensic
examination can hardly be described as ‘undue.’”); Benton v. Dlorah, Inc., No. 062488, 2007 WL 3231431, at *1, *3 (D. Kan. Oct. 30, 2007) (ordering the plaintiff in a
discrimination suit who deleted relevant e-mails from her computer to make the computer available for restoration).
268
See, e.g., Wachtel v. Guardian Life Ins. Co., 239 F.R.D. 376, 387 (D.N.J. 2006)
(“Defendants now assert that compliance with this Court’s orders will cost them millions of dollars and take months to complete. Although the cost of compliance is indeed high, Defendants have litigated this case without regard to cost when it has been
in their interest to do so. The cost Defendants must now incur is a direct result of noncompliant and deceptive discovery tactics and disregard of court orders throughout
the course of discovery.”).
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December 1, 2006, only one contested cost-shifting order remains:
Haka v. Lincoln County.
Provided that additional surveys support the conclusion that costshifting orders have decreased, the next question is why? There are
too few cases in the sample to discern the reason for the decrease, but
it is reasonable to posit two grounds. First, Rule 26(b)(2)’s presumption against discovery of reasonably inaccessible data might have
knocked out some marginal “compromise cases” when in the past
judges ordered discovery accompanied by cost shifting. Second, parties may have become more effective in negotiating electronic discovery issues without judicial intervention. This result is specifically encouraged by new Rule 26(f), which requires parties to “discuss any
issues about preserving discoverable information” at their initial con269
ference. In some cases, courts explicitly ordered parties to negotiate
cost shifting, pointing them to various factors in Zubulake and Rule
270
26(b)(2).
In others, the parties likely reached mutual understandings about electronic discovery in their Rule 26(f) conference.
Thus, while district courts have not uniformly interpreted the electronic discovery amendments, the amendments appear to have swung
the pendulum back from the liberalized cost shifting previously practiced by courts employing the marginal utility, Rowe, and Zubulake tests.
IV. REACHING EQUILIBRIUM: WHAT IS THE OPTIMAL
COST-SHIFTING PARADIGM?
Bright-line approaches to cost shifting have not gained significant
traction, despite their potential advantages in promoting uniformity,
predictability, and administrability. As has been clear since the late
1990s, letting corporate defendants bear their electronic discovery
271
expenses as a cost of doing business ignores the ubiquitous nature
of computers in our society. In laying out his rationale for the mar272
ginal utility test, Magistrate Judge Facciola ridiculed the “cost of
doing business” argument:
It is impossible to walk ten feet into the office of a private business or government agency without seeing a network computer, which is on a server,
269

FED. R. CIV. P. 26(f)(2).
See supra notes 249-51 and accompanying text.
271
A primary example of this practice is presented in In re Brand Name Prescription
Drugs Antitrust Litigation. See No. 94-0897, 1995 WL 360526, at *2 (N.D. Ill. June 15,
1995) (holding that the defendant should pay the cost of electronic discovery because
the defendant chose the very electronic storage method that made it so costly).
272
See supra Section II.A.
270
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which, in turn, is being backed up on tape (or some other media) on a
273
daily, weekly or monthly basis. What alternative is there? Quill pens?

With corporations universally backing up their files thanks to
cheap storage, the underlying assumption that parties only save par274
ticularly useful records has broken down. The absence of any kind
of cost shifting would encourage requesting parties to begin discovery
with overbroad and highly costly document requests, both as a strategic method to coerce settlements and, less calculatingly, to uncover as
275
much information as possible regardless of the cost.
As the Rowe, Zubulake, and Rule 26(b)(2) tests illustrate, courts
have come a long way from considering bright-line approaches to cost
shifting. The question today is not whether costs should ever be
shared, but rather how often. Some commentators argue that expansive cost shifting is a necessary solution to rising e-discovery costs.
Commentators Martin Redish and Marnie Pulver both advocate for
276
presumptive cost-shifting models for inaccessible data.
They correctly argue that such a model would incentivize requesting parties to
tailor their discovery to the most pertinent documents and minimize
costs. In 2004, the Sedona Conference Institute recommended that
“[i]f the data or formatting of the information sought is not reasonably available to the responding party in the ordinary course of business, then, absent special circumstances, the costs of retrieving and reviewing such electronic information should be shifted to the
277
Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 196.4 went one
requesting party.”
273

McPeek v. Ashcroft, 202 F.R.D. 31, 33 (D.D.C. 2001).
See Rowe Entm’t, Inc. v. William Morris Agency, Inc., 205 F.R.D. 421, 429
(S.D.N.Y. 2002) (“Information is retained not because it is expected to be used, but
because there is no compelling reason to discard it.”).
275
See McPeek, 202 F.R.D at 33-34 (“American lawyers engaged in discovery have
never been accused of asking for too little. To the contrary, like the Rolling Stones,
they hope that if they ask for what they want, they will get what they need. They hardly
need any more encouragement to demand as much as they can from their opponent.”).
276
See Martin H. Redish, Electronic Discovery and the Litigation Matrix, 51 DUKE L.J.
561, 569-70 (2001) (proposing that the requesting party could overcome the presumption by showing an inability to pay costs); Marnie H. Pulver, Note, Electronic Media Discovery: The Economic Benefit of Pay-Per-View, 21 CARDOZO L. REV. 1379, 1410 (2000) (arguing that forcing the requesting party to internalize discovery costs would “trim
abusive discovery requests”). Since these proposals came years prior to the 2006 ediscovery amendments, it is not clear whether the authors would advocate for presumptive cost shifting in addition to or in place of presumptive nondiscovery of inaccessible data per Rule 26(b)(2)(B).
277
SEDONA CONFERENCE WORKING GROUP ON BEST PRACTICES FOR ELEC. DOCUMENT RETENTION & PROD., THE SEDONA PRINCIPLES: BEST PRACTICES, RECOMMENDATIONS & PRINCIPLES FOR ADDRESSING ELECTRONIC DOCUMENT PRODUCTION 44
274
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step further, mandating cost shifting if the responding party “cannot—through reasonable efforts—retrieve the data or information re278
quested or produce it in the form requested.” In 2006, some practitioners urged the Advisory Committee to adopt this standard in order
279
to disincentivize abusive plaintiffs.
Judge Francis further pointed
out that liberalized cost shifting provides a welcome compromise for
judges needing to make discovery determinations under information280
The plaintiff, in turn, can add credibility to her efal uncertainty.
fort to locate the smoking-gun e-mail by taking financial responsibility
for the search.
Despite these appealing considerations, cost shifting should rarely
be granted. In addition to being antithetical to the traditional rule
281
that parties bear their own costs, a presumptive cost-shifting rule
would not reduce the entire burden on producing parties, who would
282
still have to search and review restored data for privilege. In fact, if
a presumptive cost-shifting model encouraged judges to grant discovery in cases where they otherwise would not, the burden on the defendant to review scores of restored documents could outweigh the
savings from the technical restoration. It would also undermine the
efforts of the amended Rules to limit the overall cost of discovery.
A pay-per-view approach would additionally disincentivize some
corporate defendants from innovating and maintaining cost-efficient
storage, hoping instead that the high costs of backup restoration
would thwart plaintiffs’ requests. More fundamentally, the traditional
presumption that parties pay their costs is meant to protect plaintiffs
with meritorious claims from being priced out of the discovery system.
Individual plaintiffs in employment discrimination suits, making up a

(2004), available at http://www.thesedonaconference.org/content/miscFiles/Sedona
Principles200401.pdf (italics omitted). These recommendations were made in 2004,
when cost shifting was arguably at its peak.
278
TEX. R. CIV. P. 196.4 (1999).
279
See, e.g., Letter of John H. Martin, Thompson & Knight LLP, to Peter G.
McCabe, Sec’y of the Comm. on Rules & Practice & Procedure, Admin. Office of the
U.S. Courts ( Jan. 10, 2005), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/rules/e-discovery/
04-CV-055.pdf (“The rules for electronic discovery should be fair to both plaintiffs and
defendants, and should address the significant and burdensome costs that arise when
the rules are manipulated by an abusive litigant.”).
280
See Francis, supra note 63, at 19.
281
See Oppenheimer Fund, Inc. v. Sanders, 437 U.S. 340, 358 (1978) (“Under
[discovery] rules, the presumption is that the responding party must bear the expense
of complying with discovery requests . . . .”).
282
See McPeek v. Ashcroft, 202 F.R.D. 31, 32 (D.D.C. 2001) (describing the costs to
a government agency of diverting its employees to conduct the searches).
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large portion of cost-shifting cases, typically are far poorer than the
corporate defendants; liberalized cost shifting would exacerbate this
283
If the cost-shifting presumption could be overcome
disadvantage.
284
by a plaintiff’s lack of resources, as recommended by Redish, then
the adjudication of that question would involve many of the same administrative costs as multifactor tests.
The “reasonable efforts” Texas Rule, depending on how it is interpreted by individual judges, could shift costs for all but the most
basic e-mail searches on hard drives. The Sedona Proposal would
shield from discovery nearly all archival systems that are not accessed
by the employer on a “regular basis,” regardless of accessibility and
cost, which is a vague standard that likely goes too far in preventing
meritorious discovery. It would also encourage employers to quickly
move data from online systems to storage tapes in order to attempt to
protect it from discovery.
Judge Francis is correct that there are situations in which a
nuanced cost-shifting decision is a better result than prohibiting discovery altogether or sticking the defendant with the entire bill. There
is a danger, however, that courts might overuse the tool and order discovery with cost shifting in situations where the factual record is not
well developed, as Judge Scheindlin observed had been occurring in
285
practice, or where the discovery truly represents a costly fishing expedition, regardless of who pays. Without conducting interviews of
judges who order cost shifting, it is impossible to say with certainty how
those judges would rule if cost shifting were unavailable. There is good
reason to believe that, in at least some cases, the ability to transfer costs
286
led to ordering discovery that would otherwise have been denied. In
this sense, while cost shifting may at first glance appear to be an antiplaintiff measure, in practice it may actually be harming defendants,

283

See sources cited supra note 24.
See Redish, supra note 276, at 608-18 (discussing the suggestion that courts use a
“conditional cost-shifting” analysis in allocating discovery costs).
285
See Zubulake v. UBS Warburg LLC, 217 F.R.D. 309, 320 (S.D.N.Y. 2003).
286
Judge Francis has voiced this concern:
284

Let me tell you why I think you can’t know at the outset whether the cost shifting is favorable to the producing party or favorable to the requesting party.
That is because you can’t know what the judge would have done in the absence of the ability to shift costs. If the judge simply would have denied the
discovery, then the availability of cost shifting is favorable to the requesting
party, because at least now it is in a position to get its hands on it.
Francis, supra note 63, at 18.
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who are forced to open up their storage systems and incur the costs of
287
reviewing thousands of documents for privilege prior to production.
Finally, granting access to the respondent’s computer systems at
the plaintiff’s own cost—the electronic equivalent of open warehouse
discovery—would not be a viable solution. Unlike paper filing systems
that maintain some segregation for confidential files, opening responding parties’ computer systems “would compromise legally recognized privileges, trade secrets, and often the personal privacy of em288
ployees and customers.”
As described in subsection II.B.2, cost
shifting has also brought a plaintiff-friendly discovery protocol. In
Rowe and Murphy, plaintiffs were given all of the defendant’s files, reviewed them, and then provided those they considered relevant back to
the respondents. Though this protocol has become less common in recent cases, it represents a significant danger to defendants’ privacy
and confidentiality.
In several of the cases discussed above, a party obtained access to
289
another party’s storage systems by offering to pay for access. Though
a plaintiff’s willingness to pay resolves the defendant’s financial burden (particularly when the defendant is reimbursed for its attorney
review time), courts should still scrutinize whether discovery is necessary in such cases. Wealthier plaintiffs should not get substantially
broader access to discovery than poorer ones. The advisory note to
Rule 26(b)(2), however, encourages this result: “A requesting party’s
willingness to share or bear the access costs may be weighed by the
court in determining whether there is good cause. But the producing
party’s burdens in reviewing the information for relevance and privi290
lege may weigh against permitting the requested discovery.”
It is important to recognize that the problem of electronic discovery is not just that it is expensive. Part of the problem is that it is also
ubiquitous. Companies and individuals alike now maintain nearly all
of their sensitive and confidential information electronically, including medical records, financial records, correspondence with attorneys,
287

See supra notes 144-46, 231, and accompanying text.
MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION (FOURTH) § 11.446, at 80 (2007); see also
AAB Joint Venture v. United States, 75 Fed. Cl. 432, 444 n.19 (2007) (“The Court concludes that granting Plaintiff access to hard drives would be unworkable given the inability of Defendant to protect privileged documents.”). But see Rowe Entm’t, Inc. v.
William Morris Agency, Inc., 205 F.R.D. 421, 433 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) (granting the plaintiff access to the defendant’s computer systems and select documents the plaintiff believed would be relevant).
289
See sources cited supra note 23.
290
FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(2) advisory committee’s note to 2006 amendments.
288
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personal diaries, and family photographs. In the pre-ESI era, it would
have been difficult to imagine a court ordering any attorney to rummage through a defendant’s personal home, but now, virtual invasions
291
of defendants’ personal computers are increasingly common. When
one party’s willingness to pay opens a treasure trove of potentially
confidential, personal, and irrelevant information, the “protected”
respondent is still damaged.
In Cognex Corp. v. Electro Scientific Industries, Inc., District Judge Reginald Lindsay acknowledged that the plaintiff’s willingness to pay for
292
discovery made the production question a “close call.” Judge Lindsay nevertheless denied the request, noting that the defendant, who
had already conducted an extensive search for relevant documents,
did not consciously delete documents from active space, making it un293
Judge
likely that they would only be preserved on backup tapes.
Lindsay appeared disturbed with the prospect of permitting discovery
based largely on the plaintiff’s ability to pay:
There is something inconsistent with our notions of fairness to allow one
party to obtain a heightened level of discovery because it is willing to pay
for it. There are limits on the number of depositions and interrogatories
even though more might well produce relevant information. There is
no exception to those limitations based upon one party’s willingness to
pay. The sense of fairness underpinning our system of justice will not be
enhanced by the courts participating in giving strategic advantage to
294
those with deeper pockets.

Expressing his frustration with the system in practice, Judge Lindsay
wrote, “At some point, the adversary system needs to say ‘enough is
enough’ and recognize that the costs of seeking every relevant piece of
295
discovery is not reasonable.” To the extent that the two-tiered system
allows limited discovery of inaccessible information regardless of the
requesting party’s willingness to pay for the restoration, the 2006
amendments may represent the turning point Judge Lindsay advocated.

291

See, e.g., Cenveo Corp. v. Slater, No. 06-2632, 2007 WL 442387, at *1-3 (E.D. Pa.
Jan. 31, 2007) (authorizing review of a former employee’s personal computers); Frees,
Inc. v. McMillian, No. 05-1979, 2007 WL 184889, at *3 (W.D. La. Jan. 22, 2007) (same);
Ameriwood Indus., Inc. v. Liberman, No. 06-0524, 2006 WL 3825291, at *3, 5-6 (E.D.
Mo. Dec. 27, 2006) (permitting the imaging and review of a former employee’s home
computer upon an allegation by the former employer that the defendant stored the
company’s proprietary information on the home computer).
292
No. 01-10287, 2002 WL 32309413, at *4 (D. Mass. July 2, 2002).
293
Id. at *5.
294
Id.
295
Id.
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Courts should not shy away from denying expensive production of
barely relevant discovery from storage. The advisory note to Rule
26(b)(2) effectively incorporates the marginal utility test from McPeek
v. Ashcroft by including as a relevant factor “the likelihood of finding
relevant, responsive information that cannot be obtained from other,
296
more easily accessed sources.” This factor should be paramount in
the threshold inquiry of whether any discovery at all is appropriate,
before moving to the question of cost shifting. By way of example, in
McPeek, the court rejected the plaintiff’s request for additional sampling of three out of four backup tapes, noting that although “[t]here
is a theoretical possibility that such data exists on backup tapes,” the
court “reject[s] the notion that the mere possibility that data exists
justifies forcing the government to search backup tapes irrespective of
297
The production decision also hinged on marginal utility
the cost.”
in In re General Instrument Corporate Securities Litigation, where after obtaining 110,000 pages of discovery and initially indicating satisfaction
with the disclosures, the plaintiff requested additional e-mails from
298
The court denied the production, even though the
backup tapes.
technical costs were not unduly expensive, because the limited value
from the additional documents was outweighed by the defendants’ re299
view costs.
The Medtronic case described in subsection II.B.1 should serve as a
300
warning to courts enamored with cost shifting. There, the court permitted the plaintiff to discover a set of older backup tapes unlikely to
contain relevant e-mails so long as the plaintiff paid one hundred per301
cent of the recovery, relevance-review, and privilege-review costs. But
if those tapes were so marginally relevant that they justified reimbursement of restoration and full attorney-review costs, then they should not
have been produced at all. Under the new Rule 26(b)(2)(B) framework, the court should simply conclude that the plaintiff has not shown
302
appropriate “good cause” to warrant discovery.
Taken together, the above concerns point to an optimal paradigm
in which costly discovery should be ordered only when it passes the
296

FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(2) advisory committee’s note to 2006 amendments.
212 F.R.D. 33, 35 (D.D.C. 2003).
298
See No. 96-1129, 1999 WL 1072507, at *6 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 18, 1999).
299
Id.
300
See Medtronic Sofamor Danek, Inc. v. Michelson, 229 F.R.D. 550, 553-58 (W.D.
Tenn. 2003); see also supra notes 131-40 and accompanying text.
301
229 F.R.D. at 562.
302
See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(2)(B).
297
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marginal utility test, with cost shifting reserved for exceptionally close
calls. Recall that marginal utility weighs the benefit of discovering relevant evidence against the costs to all the parties. Cost shifting does
not alter the sum of the expenses for the litigation as a whole; it merely redistributes it between the parties. It can, however, help reduce
uncertainty in cases in which the likelihood of success is speculative by
encouraging the requesting party to conduct the cheapest and most
effective search. In an ideal scenario, this would reduce costs substantially enough that the discovery passes the marginal utility test.
So which analytical framework would be the most effective in this
system? As described above, the problem with the Rowe and Zubulake
tests in practice was that by making cost shifting their primary consideration, they generally took it as a given that discovery would be or303
The “compromise” of ordering discovery
dered in the first place.
plus reimbursement led to a liberalized cost-shifting paradigm in
which parties were producing marginally relevant information at great
expense. Conversely, the problem with the two-tiered discovery system in Rule 26(b)(2) and the seven factors in the advisory note is that
they focus primarily on permitting or prohibiting discovery and do
not speak to the cost-shifting analysis. Understanding the flaws of the
judicial tests and Rule 26(b)(2) leads one to a natural two-step solution that emphasizes the strengths of each method.
A court should first decide whether discovery is appropriate and
only then consider cost shifting. This approach would begin by analyzing under Rule 26(b)(2) and its advisory note whether the information sought is not reasonably accessible because it creates an undue
burden and, if so, whether the requesting party demonstrated good
cause for why the discovery is appropriate. The marginal utility of uncovering additional information should be the key factor courts use in
this determination. Sampling will provide critical, nonspeculative estimates of both the ultimate expense and the likelihood of finding
important documents.
After the good cause inquiry is completed, in most circumstances
courts should not have to resort to a cost-shifting analysis. Either the
discovery is ordered or it is not. But when the marginal utility inquiry
is a particularly close call, courts can consider shifting costs in order to
incentivize the most cost-efficient production. When properly applied, the Zubulake test, which places the most weight on marginal util-
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See, e.g., supra note 197 and accompanying text.
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ity factors but also considers the economic resources of the parties
304
and the total cost of the production, is best suited for this analysis.
CONCLUSION
The rise and fall in cost shifting over the last decade is perhaps
best explained as a judicial knee-jerk reaction to the explosion in electronic discovery expenses. At its height, the cost-shifting paradigm
and plaintiff-friendly cost-shifting protocol undermined three goals of
the judicial system: efficient administration of justice (including protections against overbroad discovery), uniformity, and fair access to
the discovery process regardless of a party’s wealth. Although the
2006 electronic discovery amendments have not brought much uniformity to cost shifting, they appear to have restricted cost shifting to
more appropriate cases. Forcing a requesting party to pay for the responding party’s expenses should be considered an extraordinary remedy employed only after sampling, when the requesting party demonstrates a real, nonspeculative likelihood that the discovery would
lead to relevant evidence but the cost is prohibitive. The puzzling Haka decision from this Comment’s Introduction stands as an outlier in
the postamendment milieu; one can only hope that it remains so.
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See supra Section II.C.

